

SYLLABUS  
OF  
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BASED ON THE LECTURES

OF

Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M.A., Ph.D., D.Sc.,  
*(Vice-Chancellor, University of Mysore.)*



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## PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD.

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THIS Syllabus of Indian Philosophy formed the basis, in great part, of the lectures that Dr. Brajendranath Seal delivered, for several years, as George V Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Calcutta. Recently an epitome of the Syllabus was prepared by him for the use of the students of the post-graduate classes of the Mysore University, of which he is now Vice-Chancellor. My object in obtaining the author's consent to the publication of the comprehensive syllabus is primarily to show what a rich and inexhaustible mine of philosophical wealth there still exists in India for the seeker after Truth to quarry. Further, after a study of European philosophy for over thirty-five years, I feel that India could make substantial contributions to the modern stock of the world's highest speculative thought. India may not, it appears to me, be brushed aside, as she has often been, with the observation that she can boast of nothing more than primitive and exploded ideas which have only an archæological interest. Dr. Brajendranath Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* and Sir P. C. Ray's *History of Hindu Chemistry* testify to the value of the contributions that this country has made in the past to the formation of *scientific concepts*, a pioneering work necessary for the advent of the experimental sciences, and complementary to the formulation of philosophical categories.

This Syllabus at first sight appears to extend over areas placed in Europe, latterly, outside the pale of philosophy. But a little thought will show that philosophy in its wider sense necessarily stretches its roots to every region of human knowledge and practice, a feature on which the ancient Hindus laid great emphasis. Every Indian system of philosophy attempts at covering the entire field of thought, in its ultimate grounds and basic principles, from Physics to Metaphysics, including philology and a study of social institutions. In using this Syllabus for purposes of research or critical evaluation, the student should make a comparative study of both the Eastern and the Western systems of thought with reference to the entire circle of the philosophical sciences. While special care has been taken to present the general setting in each case, it has not been thought necessary to elaborate at full length the well-worn technical topics of any of the systems (*Darshanas*), but the philosophical place and significance of such topics will be easily understood from their arrangement.

Some of the systems at the end have been merely mentioned or treated only topically. The syllabus in these cases was originally

intended for the University students and has not been subsequently elaborated. I have not thought it necessary to use diacritical marks in transliterating Sanskrit words. But the technical terms can be easily read, without such marks.

It was at my special request that Dr. Seal put himself to the trouble of elaborating and presenting the consolidated syllabus in a form that might be of use to the advanced students of Indian Philosophy as well as of Indian Culture. And it is hoped that this publication will serve to stimulate further research, so that such work may help to win for India her rightful place in the world of thought.

*University of Mysore, Mysore,  
1st February 1924.*

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER.

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# INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

N.B.—*Provisionally*, in the absence of sufficient chronological data, the Systems (Darshanas) have been arranged in a *logical order*, the 'Nastika' in three divisions, Charvaka, Bauddha and Jaina, ascending from a naive Naturalism through a critique which grew more and more subjective and negative to an 'absolute Relativism', and the 'Astika' in three main divisions, the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, the Samkhya-Patanjala, and the Mimamsas (Karina and Jnana Kandas), ascending from a pluralistic Realism through a Critique of Experience (in the form of Viveka) to a Pragmatic or a Rationalistic Absolutism. Within each subdivision of the main divisions, a *historical treatment* should be added, in general surveys as well as under each important topic, with due regard to the needs of that logical order which must govern the history of all philosophical developments, or, at any rate, the presentation of such history.

as precursors of the Samkhya and the Vedanta, and the Yajnikas or the Purva-Mimamsa.

Etymological Explanation of some Myths (Akhyayikas), advanced by Yaska—Kumarila adds that they are due to misunderstandings of archaic speech and metaphors—the Prajapati-Sarasvati myth thus explained—the Indra-Ahalya myth explained—also Vritravadha (Durgacharyya).

(b) Indian classification of Yajnas (Sacrifice)—Svartha (Private), and Sva-Parartha (Public, Sarvaloka-sadharana—Kariri, etc.)—Aihika and Paratrika good, and Aniyata-phala—Abhichara (Black Magic) for Himsa (injury to others)—the five Mahayajnas—Shraddhayajna—Classification of the Samskaras—Adaptation of the Yajnas and Samskaras to the needs of the Indian environment (in Nature and Society).

(c) Philosophy of Vedic Religion, Mythology and Rituals, according to the Purva-Mimamsa.

### 3. Anthropological considerations :

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(b) Other Anthropological Elements—Traces of Totems, the Mana and the Tabu—Ancestor-worship—Folklore and Myths—Samvadas and Akhyanas in the Rigveda—in Shukla Yajus (Chap. XVI), in the Atharva-veda—in the Brahmanas—Sex in Religion and Cult and in Creation Myths—Question of Phallic worship and rites—Sacrifice—Purusha-yajna and its later symbolism.

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(d) Idea of a transcendent reality beyond the phenomenal world—the two Forms or Phases, Parama and Avara, of each of the gods (Agni, Soma, Vayu, Indra, Surya, etc.)—the gods as Dvijanmanah—a third phase in some cases—the three phases of Surya (Ut, Uttara and Uttama)—the third or Parama Pada of Vishnu—its later symbolization.

(ii) Skambha in the Atharva-veda—Space, Time, all Creation, the Gods, the existent (Sat), the non-existent (Asat), as anga (member) of Skambha—and as established (samahita) in Skambha—Rita, Satya, Tapas, Sraddha, as angas of Skambha—Skambha and Brahma.

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(c) Raja, Ekarat, Samrat, as tribal chief or leader,

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(e) the patriarchal family, eventually without paternal absolutism,

(f) individual ownership (based on possession) in village land and family property, tempered by collectivism or joint ownership as a surviving principle—Communalistic Type,

(g) accretion through the gradual incorporation or adoption of aboriginal stocks, with inferior status but without a regular social institution of slavery;

(h) gradual elaboration of social structure on a hereditary functional basis—Particulate structure in Social Composition,

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2. Indian Compendia of the Systems of Philosophy—History of the word Darshana.

### V. Systems of Philosophy—the Darshanas.

Ultimate Postulates, theoretical and practical, commonly accepted in Systems of Indian Philosophy :—

#### A. Principles of Experience :—

(1) Validity of Consciousness (Samvit) as the only source of our knowledge of the Real (Samvideva Vastupagame Sharanam—Vachaspati),

(2) the world as Appearance at least must be provided for (Jagadandhya-parihara),

(3) the world as manifold must be provided for (Jagadvai-chitryopapatti),

(4) no philosophical criticism (Preksha or Pariksha) is valid, which does not explain Laukika experience (Loka-vyavahara—Shriharsha),

(5) Samvada (harmony of experience, between the cognitive and the volitional) generally accepted as one of the tests, if not the sole test, of certitude,

(6) Legitimate doubt (Shanka, e.g., of an Upadhi in a Vyapti) has its limit. Doubt must cease when it is incompatible with the rational grounds of all practice or volitional activity—Vyaghata-vadhirashanka—But even the Astika systems recognize the usefulness of Charvaka as a Devil's Advocate for purposes of the Purvapaksha, or for the Negation which is the first stadium in the march to Affirmation.

#### B. Logical and Epistemological :—

(1) There are one or more independent sources of valid knowledge (Pramanas), and such knowledge must be, preferably, primary or original, implying a new step (Anadhigata) and, at least, uncontradicted (Abadhita) implying harmony of experience (Samvada).

(2) As a critique of all knowledge, and as a method of ascertaining truth, Logic must be a comprehensive organon. The Logic of Perception, of Testimony, and of such other Pramanas as may be accepted, are as essential as the Logic of Inference. Also, the Logic of Anadhyavasaya (the Indefinite), of Samshaya (Doubt), and of Viparyyaya (Error).

(3) Inference, as a means of ascertaining truth, must be formal-material, deductive-inductive, and not merely formal or deductive.

(4) Formal characters of every concept :—Identity, Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle (Tat parichchhinatti, anyadvavachchhinatti, tritiyaprakarabhavam cha suchayati).

(5) Formal condition of a Chain of Inference :—Anyonya-braya, Chakraka, and Anadiparampara are to be rejected in all

Kalpanas (Hypotheses, or Explanations of Fact) and all chains of argument, though admissible as a given fact in any particular case.

(6) Indirect Procedure :—The negation of the contradictory of a Proposition or Term may be employed where a direct affirmative cannot be established (Tarka, Prasamga and Apoha). —Vyavritti

(7) Material condition of Inference :—Vyapti, or Invariable relation. *N.B.*—The ascertainment of this invariant in a mass of observations (Vyapti-nirnaya) is the problem of Methodology.

C. Cosmological :—

(1) A Bhavapadartha (positive entity) which has a beginning must have an end.

(2) Whatever begins to be must have a cause ; also, *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

(3) Three orders of Relation :—Time-relation, space-relation, and cause-and-effect-relation are generally considered as constitutive of the cosmic order (Deshakalanimitta-sambandha).

(4) In Nature (Svabhava, Prakriti, Maya) there is Parinama or Arambha (change or production) ; also Niyama (Law), Pratiniyata-karanatva, and Krama (order of change or appearance). This change may be either spontaneous change from within (Svabhavikaparinama), or change *ab extra* (through Dravyantara-Samyoga).

(5) Arthakriya (effectuation) generally accepted as one of the factors of the Sat (the existent), though rarely as the sole factor.

(6) All action of matter on matter resolved into Parispanda (vibratory motion).

(7) Structure of the world usually regarded as atomic or discrete (Anavika), though some believe in a continuous mass.

(8) The word usually regarded as an infinitude of continually whirling (or vibratory) particles.

(9) The world as a series, or more often, the series of worlds (Srishti-samhara-pravaha), is held to be beginningless (anadi).

D. Psychological :—

(1) The three distinct aspects of Experience :—

(a) Bhoktritva, (b) Kartritva, (c) Pramaitritva.

(a) Sukha (feeling of pleasure) is its own evidence ; so also dukkha (feeling of pain).

(b) All effort (Cheshta or Prayatna) is for Ishta-prapti and Anishta-parihara (*i.e.*, attainment of what is favourable, anukula, and rejection of what is unfavourable, pratikula).

(c) Anubhuti (immediate presentational knowledge) is ultimate evidence (Prama).

(2) Instinctive bases of the psychic continuum (Santana) :—Samskara (Residua)—Vasana, Abhimana, Sankalpa—*e.g.*, will to pleasure (sukhi syam), will to live (with fear of death, maranatrasa), will to continued existence after death (mritva mritva punah srishtau svargi syam), etc.

(3) Sushupti, dreamless sleep, an apparent breach of the psychic

continuum, must be explained along with the subsequent report, 'sukhamaham asvapsam' (I enjoyed my sleep).

E. Ethical :—

Governing principles of Karma :—

(1) Rejection of Krita-pranasha,—whatever is sown must be reaped (moral causation and Justice—positive aspect).

(2) Rejection of akritabhyagama,—what is not sown cannot be reaped (moral causation and Justice—negative aspect).

(3) Nivritta Karma or Nishkama Karma, *generally* accepted as the *Moral Ideal* for the governance of life. This attitude of 'Work with Dispassion' equally discounts Sukha and Duhkha as being both pathological.

(4) Freedom from the law of Karma, generally posited as the goal—Uchchheda (extinction) of Vasana and Samsara, and not mere conquest of temptation, as the moral Ideal for every individual—belief in Jivanmukti (or the like) as the realization of this Freedom in life.

*N.B.*—Charvaka rejects these postulates under E.

F. In Social Philosophy :—

(1) Loka-sthiti, Loka-samgraha, Mahajana-pratyaya and Mahajana-sampradaya (social stability, social solidarity, social consensus, and social continuity) as basic principles of Society, with Loka-shreyas, social or common good, as the principle of Progress (and of Freedom).

(2) Individual *versus* Society :—Freedom of the individual from the trammels of social custom could be secured in either of the following ways :—

(a) Samnyasa—Pravrajya (Renunciation or the ascetic's life).

(b) Following the rule of life of a Veda-samnyasi Brahmanishtha Grihastha, a householder who gives up the Vedas and Vedic rites—(Kulluka Bhatta on Manu, Chapter IV, 22-24).

(c) Choosing one's own code of Achara, by choosing one's own Sampradaya (and Guru), and attaching oneself to any of the Siddhantas, whether Vedanukula or Vedabahya (such as the Shaiva, the Shakta, the Bhagavata or Pancharatra, the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Siddha, the Natha, the Sahaja), forming a Sampradaya by itself.

(*N.B.*—Such freedom of conscience in electing one's own Guru, religious sect and Acharas, was a normal feature of Ancient and Mediæval India—this was the royal Road to Freedom for the householder in the matter of caste, food and drink, marriage, the officiation of the Brahmin priest or the Kulaguru,—*e.g.*, the Shaiva marriage freely recognized adult marriage, inter-caste marriage, widow marriage, and forbade only marriage within certain degrees of kinship, and the marriage of a woman with a husband living (atra jati-kula-vayovicharo na vidyate).

(3) Trivarga-pratipatti, the harmonious cultivation of Dharma, Artha and Kama, as the guiding principle of a man's social life.

G. Juristic and Political :—

(1) Vyavahara (Law) not necessarily originating in Rajajna



(sovereign authority or command):—Achāra (Custom) also recognized as an independent source of Law, Shāstra and Samāya (Convention) being other sources.

(2) Radical separation between the legislative sphere (law-making, promulgation of Dharma) and the executive sphere (upholding Dharma through Danda).

(3) A composite Polity recognizing the functions of Communities like Village Communities, Guilds, etc., as intermediary between the State and the individual.

(4) Primacy of natural relationships and status (e.g., parent-child, society-individual, etc.) as models to which contractual or acquired relationships (e.g., master-servant, land-lord-tenant, etc.) tend to be approximated.

(5) Canons of Interpretation (and of Rationalization) for Codes of Law, Civil or Religious :—

The following considerations are essential :—

(a) order of authority (or authenticity) in case of different sources of texts (Balabala, Paurvaparyya),

(b) harmony, or resolution of conflict (Samāvaya, Samvada),

(c) the entire context (Upakrama, upasamhara—Prakarana),

(d) the essential (Vidhi-nishedha as separated from Arthavada, etc.),

(e) the principal and the auxiliary (Mukhya and Gauna, Pradhana and Guna),

(f) the whole and the part (Angi and Anga),

(g) the end and the means—Seshi and Seshu,

(h) the general and the particular (Samanya-vidhi and Visesh-vidhi),

(i) scope and jurisdiction (Adhikara),

(j) the purpose (Prayojana) and the sanction (Phalashruti),

(k) the *modus operandi* (Iti-kartavyata),

(l) the application and the relevancy established by indirect procedure (Niravakashatva, Ananyathasiddhatva),

(m) *Obiter dicta* (Prasakta and Aprasakta),

(n) the alternative, the optional and the specific provision (Vikalpa, Holaka-nyaya, etc.)—also considerations of Utsarga, Upachara, Apavada, etc.,

(o) The rule and the exception—negation and its meanings (Prasajyapratishedha and Paryyudasa),

(p) Method of Exhaustion or Residue (Parisheshya),

(q) Parcimony *versus* Prolixity (Gaurava-Laghava) and Priority of reference (Prathamopasthitatva),

(r) Restriction of Shāstric authority to Adrishtārtha, matters beyond mundane experience, and inaccessible to other Pramānas,

(s) Authority of the Code attaches *primarily* and *independently* only to Vidhi-nishedha or Niyoga (Injunction or Obligation).

H. In Practical Philosophy :—

(1) The Ajnatva or Alpajnatva (limited knowledge) and the

Bandha (bondage) of the Jiva (the individual or empirical Ego) (Ahamajnah, Aham Baddhah);—generally also, as a concomitant, the Will to Freedom (Mukti, Emancipation,—Aham baddho vimuktah syam), and the goal of a *Summum Bonum* (Paramapurushartha).

(2) Varieties of Sadhana (discipline and religious experience)—the Guru—Chaitta-guru—different Margas (Roads to Freedom) for different Adhikaras (differences of temperament or status) freely recognized—Basis of Toleration and Religious Freedom—the Indian Instinct of Samanvaya (Synthesis) and Samuchchaya (Syncretism)—concept of Yuga-dharmas and Yugavataras—Stream of dispensations—new promulgations of the Vedas conceived as Eternal Wisdom—no fixed historic centre—Study of Yavanamata, the thirty-first Vidya.

(3) The emphasis on Yoga.—Yoga as a general method of auto-hypnotism—Chitta-vritti-nirodha (mental inhibition for producing a mental blank or void) with Samyama and Samadhi (one-pointed or focussed Consciousness)—Various types of Yoga:—Yoga based on the concept of Atman or Purusha—Yoga based on the concept of Ishvara or Brahma—Way of Ascent (Aroha) and of Descent (Avaroha)—of Anvaya (affirmation or comprehension) or of Vyatireka (negation, *neti neti*)—two typical forms of Dhyana—(a) Cosmic expansion of Self (sarvam tatam) and (b) the Universal Void (Sarvam shunyam)—Samprajnata and Asamprajnata Samadhi—the Buddhist and Jaina Dhyanas.

#### CHARVAKA.

Brihaspati Sutras—the Lokayatikas—Charvakas—Schools of Materialism and Naturalism—More crude and less crude forms—Sushikshita Charvaka—Charvaka-Dhurta—Ardha-lokayatikas.

(a) Doctrine of Pramana—Pratyaksha—Rejection of Akasha as a Bhuta—the question of Manasa Pratyaksha—Rejection of Anumana and of Vyapti—the passage from a few observed to all unobserved cases (Sarvopasamhara) unwarranted—Upadhi-shanka can never be ousted—Anumana a kind of Pratibha—is it Kakataliyanaya (chance) or Sambhavana (Probability)—question of Knowledge regarding the Past and the Future—Smriti—Samskara—Charvaka-Dialectic—Charvaka Sceptics—the Charvaka-dhurta's tattva-vyakhya—Pramana-prameya-samkhyu-lakshana-niyamashakyakarniyatvam—irregular cases of Pratyaksha—sense of bent fingers, or of fingers wide apart—Nyaya explanation—Tattvopaplavavada—Jaina critique—Natural Law—Cause and the principle of Causality—Svabhava—Chance—Ghunakshara-Nyaya—Spontaneity—Yadrichchliikatva—Nyaya criticism of Svabhava-Karana —Kala-Karman

(b) Life—the question of the genesis of living organisms from non-living matter—Bhutachaitanya—Mind—the automaton theory—the Bhokta as Sharira, as Indriya, as Dehendriya-Sanghata—Chaitanya is nothing but Prana—Nyaya and Vedanta criticism.

(c) Charvaka Ethics.—The ethical standard and calculus—One's own happiness (Sukha), the only motive and criterion—Extraction of the fullest possible satisfaction from every situation, the

rule of conduct—Matsya-shalika-varjans-nyaya, as distinguished from Balavadanishtansnubandhishts-sadhansts of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika—the present must not be unduly subordinated to the future—Freedom from superstition proclaimed—unqualified secularism—Heaven, Hell, Future Births, Paralsukika good, discarded—Rejection of deferred effects and of two series of consequences mundane and extra-mundane—Charvaka's Ishvara, Svarga and Naraka—Definitions of Purushartha and Apavarga in Brihaspati's Sutras—Charvaka's dogmatic materialism contrasted with the rationalism ('Yavadupspanna' motto) of the Nsiyyikas (Nysyakusumanjali)—attitude of the Sushikshita Charvakas—attitude of Charvaka sceptics—the problem of disinterested conduct, e.g., Dana (Charity)—Charvakas postulate self-interest in such cases, e.g., motives of Khyati, Puja, Janaranjana, Smara-Smarthya—Venkatesha's reply.

(d) Casuistry, Freethinking and Statecraft in relation to ethical problems, and Ethics generally (discussions in the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the Arthashastra and the Puranas).

(e) Polity—Brihaspati's recognition of Dandaniti and Varta as the only Vidyas, Sciences, to the exclusion of Trayi (Vedas) and Anyikshiki (Philosophy)—Brihaspati on the evils of a State of Nature and the primary need of the King's office (Mahabharata)—the monarchical State—the Supremacy of Dandaniti—Ethics subordinated to Dandaniti in Brihaspati, Ushana, and Bharadvaja—Arthashastra as independent of Dharmashastra—*Real Politik* in Kautilya's School.

(f) Religion—Charvaka on the origin of Scriptures—Charvaka's defence of insistence on priest-craft (including Pratarana and 'Buddhipsurusha-hinsnam jivika') as the originating factor for religious codes—Reply of Udsyana—of Venkatesha—also, defence of Shastra as parental authority administering sugar-coated pills (medicines with *madakas*) to children—hence no deceit in Prashasti or Phala-shruti passages.

Charvaka's criticism of the Scriptures—the three faults, Anrita (including Assmavada and Visamvada), Vyaghata and Punsrukti—also meaninglessness (Jarphari Turphari, Ha-ya-va-ra-Is,—*abracadabra*)—Charvaka's critique compared with the Buddhistic and the Jain (cf. Abhayasuri's) objections to the Apurusheya.

(g) Freethinking in Religion—'Ardha-Lokayatikas' (Bhattas, etc.) on the Gods, and on Prayer and Worship.

(h) Nastika-mata as characterized in Shukra-niti—Naturalism.

(i) Other forms of Naturalism—Sahaja-mata and other medicinal doctrines (Advaya-vajra)—[the four Anandas]—Rejection of all Philosophical Systems.

### Buddhistic Systems.

- A.—A brief historical notice of the different schools of Buddhism.  
B.—1. Epistemology and Logic—General Survey.

(a) Epistemology :—Validity and Value of Knowledge—Doctrine of Truth and Error—Prama and Pramanyagraha—Kalpanapc-dhatva—Svalakshana and the Kalpanas—the question of Svabhava-vikalpa—Pradarshakatva—Prapakatva—Samvada—Svasanivedana—Identity—Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle—in what sense Anumana is Pramana—the field for each kind of Pramana—the question of Pramana-samplava—and of Upaplava—Buddha's dialectic of Vibhajya-vada—Madhyamika dialectic—Prasanga versus Svatantra.

(b) Logic—Pratyaksha and Anumana, analysed and classified—Drishtanta in Anumana—kinds of Drishtanta—the Methods of Induction—Pancha-Karani—Vyapti and Vyaptigraha—Tarka—the Principle of Causality—Svabhava—Anupalabdhii—the question of Antarvyapti—Controversy with the Nyaya—Application of Antarvyapti in the Anumana, "Sarvam Kshanikam."—What is not Kshanika in Buddhist Ontology.

(c) Shabdashakti—Import of Propositions—Apohavada—Anyapohavishista-vidhi as Shabdārtha—the question of Shaktisankaryya—the relation of Thought to Language—Abhilapa and Kalpana.

Rejection of Shabda as a separate Pramana—the Buddhist attacks on the Shruti and the Itihasas—Kumarila's reply—Udayana's reply—the Buddhist view of the Vakta (Pravakta).

2. Theory of Being and of Causation :—Dialectic—General Survey—

(a) Ontology (after Sarvastivada) :—

The Dharmas (1) as Ayatanas, Indriya and Vishaya, (2) as Dhatus, Indriya, Vishaya and Vijnana, (3) as Skandhas, Rupa, Vedana, Samjna, Samskara and Vijnana, (4) as Satyas, dukkha, samudaya, nirodha and marga, (5) as Sasrava and Anasrava, (6) as Samskrita and Asamskrita.

Special topics :—(1) Rupa, bhuta, bhautika, (2) Chitta, Chaitta, Samskara, (3) Chittasamprayutta and Chitta-viprayutta Samskara, (4) Prapti and Aprapti, (5) Avijnapti, (6) Anatma, (7) the three Asamskritas, Akasha, Pratisamkyha-nirodha, and Apratisamkhyha-nirodha, the two last being compared with the two kinds of Avidya-nasha in Shankara-Vedanta.

(b) Kshanabhangavada and its dialectic—Arthakriya—the question of Sahakari and Samudaya in Causation—Sahabhu and Sahakari—the question of Atishaya (upakara)—distinction between upakara and utkarsha—Samskrita-dharma and Samskrita-lakshana—Upalakshana—the Anumana, "Sarvam kshanikam."—Two forms, direct and indirect, by Anvaya and Vyatireka Vyapti—Two kinds of Drishtanta—Jaina and Nyaya criticisms refuted.(ii) Bahyartha-bbanga

(c) Sanghata—the question of Avayavi—the question of Samanya and Vishesha.

(d) (1) Santana—Vijnana-Santana—Vasana-Samkramana — question of Sarvajna-Santana. (2) Santanantara-Siddhi—Controversy with the Nyaya. (3) Dialectic of the Self—Vijnana-pravaha—Alaya-Vijnana—the question of Shuddha or Nirakara Jnana—Unity, Identity,

Permanence and Substantiality refuted—explanation of Samuhalam-bana and Pratyabhijñana—Meaning of Continuity—explanation of Triputi-Samvit: —Ālambana discussed (Dignaga, Kumarila, Udayana)

(e) Pratitya-samutpada—Hetu and Pratyaya—the four Pratyayas and the six Hetus—compared with the Nyaya-Vaisheshika analysis of causation.

(f) The Wheel of Life—Special topics—(a) Avijja, Tanha, Upadana, (b) Vinnana, Nama-rupa, Satayatana, Phassa, Vedana, (c) Kamma-bhava and Upapatti-bhava.

(g) Shunya—Samvritic existence—Kalpanic existence.

(h) Paramartha and Vyavahara—Nitartha and Neyartha (cf. Jaina Naya.)

[Differences between early Hinayana and early Mahayana in respect of the above topics.]

3. Buddhist Psychology—the Sub-conscious—Bhavanga—Manodvara and Panchadvara—Chetasikas—Processes and Functions—the Doctrine of Kshanas—Chitta-chaittika dharmas—the Dhatus, Indriya, Vishaya, Vijnana (compared with Triputi-Samvit)—Manodhatu, Manovijnana-dhatu—the five Skandhas—Rupa, (indriya, vishaya, and avijnapti), Vedana, Samjna, Samskara and Vijnana—Chitta-samprayutta-samskara—Chetana—Karma—compound psychoses—conflicting or contradictory elements in psychic composition—meaning of compositeness.

Special topics :—(a) Perception and its four Pratyayas, (b) Pratyabhijñana, (c) Prajna, apperception, vitarka, vichara, (d) Dhyanas and their stages, (e) Kama, Rupa, Arupa, Lokottara, (f) the Buddhist view of Atma compared with the different views in the Upanishads, and with the Jaina view.

4. Ethics—Psychological Ethics—Good and Bad Samskaras—Classification :—(a) Mahabhumikas, Kushala, Klesha, Akushala, Upaklesha, (b) Paritta-bhumika, (c) Aniyata-bhumika—Comparison with the Jaina lists under samvara, ashraiva and bandha—Buddhist concept of Karma—of Vipaka—Avijnapti—Doctrine of Responsibility—Posthumous Responsibility—Virati and Avirati—Responsibility for an Institution or Installation—Ethical discipline—Place of Altruism in Buddhist Ethics—how far this is consistent with Buddhist Metaphysics.

5. Philosophical Disciplines :—Special topics—(a) Bhavana-Chatushtaya (b) Kammatthana—Shila—Samadhi—Panna (c) Kasina—Ashubhanussati—Buddhanussati—Brahmavihara—Aruppa—Sanna—Vavatthana—Samadhi—Vipassana—the Nanas—Jhanas and their Stages (d) Dashabhumi—Dashavala—Paramitas (e) Tathata (f) the Nirodhas (g) Nirvana—original definitions in the Suttas—compared with Vedantic Manonasha and Vasana-kshaya—Klesha-nirvana—Skandha-nirvana.

6. Philosophical standpoints :—Realism, Idealism and Nihilism : (a) Points of difference between Sarvastivada and Vijnanavada as regards (i) the question of distinction between subjective and objective, internal and external—controversies with the Nyaya regarding Sarupya,

Sakara-jnana and Vishayata (objectivity), (ii) the question of an all-inclusive Alaya-jnana, (b) Points of difference between Vaibhashika and Sautrantika—question whether utpada, jara, etc., are 'dravyato santi na va'—the Nyaya Criticism—question whether the Past and the Future are real, (c) Different schools among the Vaibhashikas and Sautrantikas regarding the existence (or efficiency) of the Past and the Future—Bhava, Lakshana, Avastha and Apeksha Parinama—the Vibhajyavadins—Comparison with the Patanjala and the Jaina views, (d) Sautrantika doctrine conceived as a theory of mediate or representative cognition of the world, or as "cosmo-thetic dualism"—the Nyaya-Vaisheshika critique, (e) Vijnana-vada—the Nyaya critique (after Jayanta's Nyaya-manjari)—the Samkhya critique (after Vyasa and Vijnana-bhikshu)—the Advaita-Vedanta critique—the Dvaita-Vedanta critique—the Jaina critique—the Bhatta critique—the Prabhakara critique, (f) Madhyamika doctrine—Dialectic of Relations of Nagarjuna (and Chandrakirti) compared with the Advaita and the Jaina dialectic—whether determination by negation (of negation) explains synthetic (Samavaya) relations—Shunyavada—the Nyaya-Vaisheshika critique—the Samkhya critique—the Shankara-Vedanta critique—the Madhyamika Logic of Nescience—Avidya and Vasana—Intellectualistic versus voluntaristic concepts—Comparison with the Avidya and Maya of the Shankara-Vedanta, (g) Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara and Madhyamika positions as conceived in Madhava's Sarvadarshana-Samgraha.

7. Various forms of latter-day Mahayana—the Yanas, Kala, Vajra, Hevajra, Heruka-vajra, etc.—Buddhist Tantras—the Trikaya doctrine—Mahasukha as the fourth Kaya—latter-day concepts of Dhyani-Buddhas and Bodhisattvas—of Pratyekabuddha—of Nairatma and Karuna—Shunya and Karuna to be realized as abhinna—mixed modes, the Nathas, Siddhas, Sahajiyas—marks of a Vajradhara—the four Shunyas, Shunya, Ati-shunya, Maha-shunya and Sarva-shunya—the four Ananda-Kshanas—Samarasa-philosophical resolution into Advaya—Jagat regarded as alika (like Saha-shringa)—as a *sva-viruddha* concept (like Bandhya-putra)—contrast with the Vyavaharika Jagat (Sadasadatmika-maya-parinama) of Vedantic monism—Jagat as one of the Adyanutpannas—latter-day forms of Ajati-vada—Identity (Aikya) of Loka and Nirvana—of Bhava and Abhava—of Shunya and Ashunya—of Samvriti and Paramartha—Svarupam Nirvanam—differences between Buddhistic and Shankarite Monism.

8. Trinitarian developments and Schools of Bhakti and Salvation by Grace, in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.

#### Jaina System.

##### 1. Theory of Knowledge and Logic.

(a) Prama and Pramanyagraha — Relation of Knowledge to its object (Vishaya)—question of the determination of Knowledge, or of its form, by the object. The Pramanas—Pratyaksha and Paroksha—Divisions—Pratyaksha as Vishada or Spashta—Veishadya

as Aavyavadhanena Idamta-Pratibhasa or Vishesha-prakasha, clearly, distinctly, and independently of other Pramanas — Pratyaksha as Samvyavaharika and Paramarthika—Samvyavahara as Samichina - pravritti-nivritti - rupo Vyavaharah (Voluntaristic, if not Behavioristic, view)—four stages, Avagroha, Iha, Avaya, Dharana — Avagraha, the "first impression", Satta-matra darshanat jatam adyam avantara - samanyakara - vishishta - vastugrahanam — Iha, avagrihitavisheshakamkshana — Avaya, ihita-vishesha-nirnaya—Dharana as dridhatamavasthapanna avaya, and smritihetu through samskara — Paroksha—analysis of Smarana—Smriti as Samskarodbodhanibandhana, tadityakara, also anubhutarthavishaya — Pratyabhijnana as samkalanatmaka jnana, anubhuta-smritihetuka — Prabhachandra's extension of Pratyabhijnana to cover all cases of representative-presentative cognition of Relation—kinds of relation, Tadevedam, Tatsadrisham, Tadvilakshanam, Tat-samjnitoyam, Tat-pratigyogi (identity, similarity, dissimilarity, relation of sign and signate, correlation), etc.,—Upamana, a case of Pratyabhijnana—the Uttara-Mimamsa reply that Upamana is a case of conversion of Symmetrical Relations, and accordingly a separate Pramana, being different from Anumana (Inference by Linga-paramarsha, Mediate Inference), as well as from Pratyaksha and Smriti — Tarka as *Idam asmin satyeva bhavati ityadyakaram samvedanam*, or as Upalambhanupalambhanimittam Vyapti-jnanam—Anumana as Sadhanat Sadhyavijnanam—two, three or five Avayavas—the question of the mark or marks of a Hetu—Controversy with the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas—the question of Anumana being a *petitio principii*—Agama—Aptapariksha—the question of Sarvajnatva — Kevala-Jnana.

(b) Realism and Nominalism—Tiryyak and Urddhvata Samanya—the question of Padashakti—Controversy with the Nyaya and the Mimamsa—Vakyartha — Origin of language—Samaya—Sanketa—Varnasanketa—Gandhasanketa—the Relation of Thought to Language.

(c) Dialectic :—Nayavada, Anekantavada—Contrasted with Buddha's Vibhajyavada—Distinction between Naya and Pramana—the various Nayas and their succession—Comprehension of other Philosophical Stand-points in the Nayas—the dialectical movement in the successive steps of the Saptabhangi—the movement from the third to the fourth, and from the fourth to the fifth step—Why seven distinct Steps and no more in the Saptabhangi—Avaktavya of Syadvada contrasted with the Anirvachaniya of Shankara and with other attempted reconciliations of contradictories.

(d) Application of Jaina dialectic to the refutation of Aikantic positions regarding the following :—Bhava and Abhava—Samanya and Vishesha—Ekatva and Anekatva—Bheda and Abheda—Dvaita and Advaita—Nityatva and Kshanikatva—relation between Karyya and Karana—relation between Dravya and Guna—Samavaya Relation in general — Antarangartha and Bahyartha — the question

of Samvidadvaita and Chitrajnana—the question of Vidhi-Pratishedha.

## 2. Categories of Reality :—

(a) The nine Tattvas (Verities).

(b) The six Dravyas (Entities)—Five with Pradeshas, called Astikayas—one, Kala, without Pradesha.

(c) Definitions of Pradesha (Umasvati and Nemichandra)—Comparison with the concept of Parimandalya—Question of one-to-one correspondence between Pradesha and Anu—Distinction between Pradesha and Avayava.

(d) Division of Dravyas into Arupi (amurta) and Rupi (murta)—Nishkriya and Kriyavat,—Ekadravya and Anekadravya—Dravyas with Samkhyeya, Asamkhyeya and Ananta Pradeshas—concept of Anantananta—of Sukshma.

(1) Jiva, amurta; svadeha-parinama, upayogamaya, karta, bhokta, siddha, urddhvagati—Parasparopagraha as the Upakara of Jiva—Question of Parimana of Jivatma—various theories (Yamunacharyya).

(2) Pudgala—Anu and Skandha—Whether Anu has Pradesha—Upakara of Pudgala—Theory of Atomic Linking (Bandha).

(3&4) Dharma, gatyupagrahaka;—Adharma, sthityupagrahaka—System of Motion (sakrit gati); System of Rest (yugapat sthiti);—Dharma and Adharma as Lokavyavastha-hetu.

(5) Akasha (ananta-pradesha)—Lokakasha (asamkhyeya-pradesha)—Avagaha as upakara of Lokakasha—Moksha, liberation, conceived as the upward motion or rush of the Jiva to the utmost limit of Lokakasha—Alokakasha without Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Kala.

(6) Kala without pradesha—Paramarthika Kala (Real Time)—Vyavaharika Kala (applied or conventional time)—Vartana, duration, as the upakara of Kala (Paramarthika kala, real time)—Parinama (change), Kriya (gati, motion), and Paratvaparatva (succession and simultaneity) as other upakaras of Kala (Vyavahara kala, applied or conventional time).

Concept of Samaya—as Sukshma, anu, ekaikavritti, bhinna-bhinna-pradeshastha—comparison with Patanjala, Vaisheshika and Buddhist Kshana.

Vyavaharakala (applied Time) as anekadravya, consisting of ananta samaya.

Question whether Paramarthika Kala, Real Time, is

(i) Eka, parama-sukshma, nirvibhaga; or

(ii) aneka-dravya, consisting of ananta-samaya, being a *paryyaya*, a beginningless and endless series, and, as *dravya*, nitya vyapi (and eka); or

(iii) aneka-dravya (manifold) like Vyavahara-kala (applied or conventional time), and differing for every different division of Akasha (prati-lokakasha-pradesha-bhinna)—a general doctrine of Relativity



with reference to Real Time (Prabha-Chandra)—contrast with Vachaspati's concept of Gatikshana-Prachaya to explain differences of velocity.

(e) Besides Jiva and Pudgala (Matter, Mass), the three ultimate reals in Jaina Philosophy are—Pradesha of Akasha (Space), Samaya of Kala (Time), and Gati or Sthiti (motion or rest) as upagrihita by Dharma or Adharma.

(f) Cosmology—(a) Concepts of Dravya, Guna, Paryyaya, Parinama, (b) Atomic theory—Cosmic Evolution—Sanghata—Bheda—Sanghata-bheda, (c) Classification of Jivas—the question of Panpsychism.

3. Psychology—the question of mind-stuff and psychic atoms—classification and analysis of mental functions—a brief view.

4. Ethics :—

(a) The Ethical Standard—Vishuddhi and Sanklesha—the question of Vidhi-Nishedha—eleven different views of Niyoga and their refutation—Various schools of Ethics :—Niyoga as (1) Shuddham Karyyam, (2) Shuddha Prerana, (3) Preranasahitam Karyyam, (4) Karyyasahita Prerana, (5) Karyyasyaiva upacharatah Pravartakatvam, (6) Karyyapreranayoh Sambandhah, (7) Tatsamudayah, (8) Tadubhayasvabhava-vinirmuktah, (9) Yantrarudha Atma, (10) Bhogyarupah, (11) Purusha eva—Niyoga as Samvedanavivarta—as Chidatmobhayasvabhava—as Samvedana-matra—Jaina refutation of these views (and schools).

(b) Punya and Papa—the originating conditions—classes of Punya and Papa—Punya as Satkarma-pudgala—Papa as the opposite—the Jaina theory of Karma—Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva.

5. Social Philosophy :—

(a) Rejection, in theory, of caste by birth, on the following grounds among others :—(1) unavoidable miscegenation, and break in the line of descent (Viplutatva); (2) undetected change of caste after migration from home; (3) absence of distinctive or specific character (Vilakshanatva); (4) inter-breeding among castes does not result in any hybrid type—accordingly, Caste, only a functional class (Sadrisha-kriya-parinama-nibandhana);—nevertheless, adoption of Varna among latter-day Jainas at Upanayana-samskara—this Varna hereditary—Vamshas recognized—the Upavita (thread) not allowed to all the Varnas.

(b) How the Mantras at Upanayana for the three thread-wearing Castes, and for the four castes in general, as well as the Pratijnas at Vivaha, are distinguished from the Brahminical ones—the position of the bride at the Vivaha Samskara (marriage)—the Vrataropa Samskara, distinctive of the Jaina.

(c) How the Jainas elaborated codes of Samskara, Vyavahara and Niti (e.g., Bhadrabahu, Somadeva-suri, etc.) for themselves—contrast with the Buddhists' remissness in this regard—Comparison of Jaina Inheritance, Stridhana and Partition with the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga systems—Except as regards joint family, Jaina social

structure fairly conforms in essentials to the Brahminical, though the Samskaras differ in Paddhati—Medhatithi, the commentator on Manu, twits the non-Brahminical monks and priests with their dependence on Brahminical law-givers in social and (domestic) organization (*cf.* also Vachaspati)—this was truer of the Buddhists than of the Jainas—how far Jaina Social Institutions embody the principles of Jainism.

(d) Monachism exalted as a *sine qua non* of the attainment of the spiritual goal—consequent degradation of the normal social life—the laity, however, more valued in Jainism than in Buddhism, as they had codes of Samskaras and Vyavahara to themselves—Compartmental division into secular (laic) and religious (monachic) life, in Jainism and Buddhism, contrasted with the original orthodox Brahminical plan of successive stages (Ashramas) in the same individual's life—Contrast also the primacy of monachism and celibacy in Jaina and Buddhist teaching with the primacy of Grihasthushrama in the earlier Brahminical teaching (Manu, Vashishtha, etc.)—these last promise *Mukti* to the dutiful house-holder with or without rites and observances (Gautama, Vashishtha and Apastamba *Sutras*, Manu and Yajnavalkya *Sutras*, etc.)—Pravrajya discouraged and State-regulated in Kautilya.

6. Practical Philosophy :—The Categories, Ashrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara, Moksha.

Special topics :—

(a) Under Ashrava and Bandha—Karmapudgala—Shubha, Ashubha and Shuddha Vritti—Bhavashrava, Dravyashrava—Avaraniya, Mohaniya and Vedaniya Karma—Prakriti-bandha.

(b) Under Samvara :—(i) the three Guptis, the ten Dharmas, the twelve Anuprekshas—the Parishaya-jaya for Akrosha, Badha, Alabha, Prajna, Ajnana—the Charitras—(ii) the five Vratas.

(c) Under Nirjara and Moksha :—Savipaka and Avipaka Nirjara—the fourteen Gunasthanas—the four Dhyanas—Sayoga-kevali—Anantachatushtaya—Ayogakevali—Samyak Darshana, Samyak Jnana, Samyak Charitra.

7. Religious Sentiment—the place and meaning of Worship and Prayer—Faith—Use of Images—Jaina Stotras—'Jaina Gayatri'.

8. Metaphysics—the World—the Soul—the Perfect Being—the doctrine of Paramatman.

9. Important points of difference between Digambara and Shvetambara Jainism—the question of the Universality of Salvation—the case of women—Stri-mukti admitted by the Shvetambaras and the Gopya-samgha Digambaras—the question of Abhavyatva.

*The Nyaya-Vaisheshika.*

A.—Epistemology and Logio—

(a) Truth and the ascertainment of Truth (Prama and Pramanyagraha)—Prama characterised as a correspondence of Relations—Shriharsha's critique—Guna and Dosha—Samshaya—Different views of Samshaya—two or four Kotis in Samshaya—Viparyyasa—Theories of Viparyyasa. Anadhyavasaya (after Vaisheshika)

(b) Methodology—Lakshana—Uddesha and Vibhaga—Uha—Pariksha and Nirnaya—Kalpana (Hypothesis) and its conditions—Vinigamaka—Siddhanta—Disputation—Yada, Jalpa, Vitanda—Abhyupagama—Vada—Praudhivada. —Nigrahasthanas

Methodology of Special Sciences (or Doctrines) as illustrated by

(1) the apparatus of Analytical and Descriptive Grammar (an 'Algebra' of Grammar)—other uses of general symbols in Phonetics, Prosody and Music—Loshtaka-Prastara, the calculus of permutations and combinations, applied to enumeration and classification (e.g., of metres, artificial scents, etc.),

(2) the Logic of Therapeutics, as in Vimanasthana and Sutrasthana (Charaka),

(3) the Logic of Law Codes—apparatus and nomenclature (Paribhasha) of Legal Interpretation as in Mimamsa Nyaya,

(4) the (Analytical) Sutra Method of Scientific Redaction (with Prakarana and Adhikarana for arrangement of topics, and with Purvapaksha, Uttarapaksha, and Siddhanta for dialectics)—contrasted with the (deductive or *a priori*) Geometric Method of Greek origin—varieties of the Sutra Method as seen in the extant Sutras, e.g., of Darshana and Vyakarana—of Dharma, Artha, Kama—of Medicine—also, Shastras of Samgita, Natya and Alankara,

(5) the apparatus of a Formal Logic of Relations as attempted in Navya-Nyaya—use of generalised symbols like the concepts, Avachchedaka, Prakara, Nirupana, Vritti, Samanadhikarana, Vyadhikarana, Vaishishtya, Vyapya, Vyapaka, Upadhi, Pratiyogi, Abhava-Pratiyogi, etc., the affixes, tva or ta, ka, etc., the particles nan, eva, prati, yat tat, tat tat, sva, etc.

(c) Pramana—question of Samplava—of Upaplava—of Pramana-Virodha.

(d) Prama, Pramanyagraha and Pramanas after the Vaisheshika Sutras—Refutation of Svasamvedanatva, Triputi-pratyakshatva, Vishaya-samvedananumeyatva and Jnatatavada in relation to Jnana.

(e) Analysis of Pramanas (after the Nyaya):—

1. Pratyaksha—Savikalpa—Vyavasaya — Anuvyavasaya — the question of Nirvikalpaka Jnana—Guna and Dosha of Perception—Fallacies of Perception—Dosha, Asamprayoga, Samskara.

2. (i) Anumana—Classes of Anumana—different interpretations of Seshavat, Purvavat, Samanyato-drishta—question whether Samanyato-drishta is nitya-paroksha-vishaya—number of Avayavas—Paksha, Sapaksha, Vipaksha—Drishtanta—two classes—Sadhya—different views of Sadhya—Linga-pramarsha—Paksha-dharmata—various views.

(ii) Ground of Induction—Vyapti and Causality—whether Causality independent of Vyapti—question of Svabhava Pratibandha.

(iii) Vyapti—various definitions—Siddhanta-lakshana—whether Vyapti is between Samanyas or Vishishtas or both—considerations of Laghava in this regard—Classes of Vyapti—Upadhi—Four kinds

of Ūpadhi—Vyaptigraha—whether Pratibandha-graha is due to a kind of manasa praṭyaksha—elimination of Upadhis—Tarka—Upadhi-shankanirasa.

(iv) Causality—Anyathasiddhas—elimination of Anyathasiddhas—Plurality of Causes—Synchronousness of Cause and Effect.

(v) Tarka—various meanings—Tarka as Negative application of Causality—ultimate ground in Vyapti—the limits of Tarka and Doubt.

(vi) The Methods of Induction—Agreement *versus* Difference—Joint Methods—the question of the Panchakarani.

(vii) Discussion of Anvaya-vyatireki, Kevalanvayi and Kevala-vyatireki Anumana.

(viii) The question of Antarvyapti—question of a class or a closed group as a Paksha, and Drishtanta comprised in the class.

(ix) The question of Anumana being a *petitio principii*.

(x) Hetu and Hetvabhasas—Fallacies of Inference.

3. (i) Shabda—Paurusheya *versus* Apaurusheya—Marks of an Apta—question of Shabda-Nityatva—the four-fold Vak—question of Sphota and of Varna—various theories—controversy between Nyaya and Mimamsa—Refutation of the Mimamsa view that all Shabda originally imports an absolute fiat, Vidhi (*Pragmu*)—Refutation of the view of the Panini-darshana that all Shabda imports the One Universal Truth (Satyah Sarvah Sadatmakah—Shabda-Brahma—the Logos).

(ii) Shabda-Shakti—Pada-Shakti—different views—Lakshana and its kinds—the Sentence or Vakya, the unit of speech—analysis of Vakya—(1) Syntactical analysis, akamksha, asatti, yogyata, tatparyya, (2) logical analysis, Uddeshya and Vidheya for Samsargavadis, or Kriya and Karta for Bhavana-vadis, (3) Vakyartha, or the Import of Propositions—different theories, anvitabhidhana, abhihitantvaya, anviyamanabhidhana, abhidyanamanvaya, 'Padanam samhatyakaritvam', (4) various relations expressed in Propositions, Paryyaya or Ekarthata, Tadatmya, Samsarga, Samanadhikaranya, Akhandartbata, etc.—Analytical and Synthetical Propositions—Verbal Propositions and Definitions, (5) Existential Import of Propositions—a Visheshya as a Vyavartyabhavavat—a Pratiyogi as an abhava-viralatmaka—whether an imaginary (alika Padartha) can be a Visheshya or a Pratiyogi—whether an imaginary (e.g., Sashashringa) can be denied—the abhava of a Sarvatha-anupalabhdha is only taditara-samagri-sakalya, (6) Meanings of Negation, (7) the Karaka relations, karma, karana and adhikarana, (8) meaning of a causative—meaning of an Imperative—meaning of Vidhi and Nishedha—question of Abhidha—question of Bhavana, Prerana and Niyoga, (9) Samashas—the relations expressed in Samashas—Order in Samashas, (10) Question of Priority between Visheshana and Visheshya, between Kriya and Karta, from the linguistic, the logical and the psychological point of view.

—Categories of Grammar expressed as categories of

Thought (Patanjali)

(iii) Origin of Language—different theories—Cheshta—Sanketa—Samaya—Ishvarabhipraya—Adarsha and Pada—[First names whether attributive or predicative, whether general or singular, whether concrete or abstract—different views reported in Yaska, Patanjali, etc.]—Asura-and-Mlechha speech (of Ashur-and-Melek (h)-worshippers ??) in the Śatapatha—Asura battle-cry, Hailo Hailo (invocation of Semitic El, 'Eloah, 'Elohim, 'Elioun,—later cry Allah Allah! ??)—Mlechha (non-Dravida) words in the Vedas—Kumarila accepts non-Sanskrit origin for Mlechha, Dravida, Parasika, Barbara, Yavana, Raumaka and other languages, but all languages regarded in the mediæval Puranas as derived from Sanskrit—Instances in proof—Names in Yavani Bhasha for Pitri, Bhratri, Ashva, Janu, Sapta, instanced in Bhaviṣhya-purana (Pratisarga Parva)—how language is learnt—Vyutpatti—different theories—whether a Madhyama-vridha is necessary—Discussion.

(iv) Relation of Thought to Language—various views—controversy with the Buddhists, the Jains and the Mimamsakas—Question whether Vachya and Prameya (or Jneya) are co-extensive.

4. Upamana—differently conceived by different authorities—Vishvanatha on Analogy without Vyapti—Nyaya explanations contrasted with Jaina and Mimamsa views.

5. Other alleged Pramanas—Arthapatti—Anupalabdhi—Tarka—Uha—Parishesha—Sambhava—Cheshta—Sanketa—Question of their reduction to accepted Pramanas—Aitiḥya—Lokaprasiddhi—Pratibha—different definitions of Upamana, Sambhava and Pratibha—of Uha and Tarka—the question of Smṛiti-pramānya.

6. Types of Pragmatism in Nyaya and other Systems :—Logical (Samvada, Prapakatva)—Epistemological (Vyaghata as ultimate solvent of Doubt)—linguistic (Bhavana, Udyoga, Cheshta as Vakyartha)—radical (Arthakriya as constituting Satta)—Voluntaristic (Pratipatti—Vidhi, or Jnana as a form of Kriya)—Absolute (conceptual construct of Nirguna Brahma for pragmatic ends).

B—Theory of Reality :—

(i) Categories of the Vaisheshika-sutras—analysis of Concepts of Dravya, Samavaya, Samanya, Vishesha and Abhava—Sub-divisions—Distinction between Guna and Karma—question of Prabhava—Special topics :—(a) Gurutva—(b) Samskara—Vega—Sthiti-sthapaka—Bhavana—(c) Prithaktva—Anyonyabhava—Atyantabhava.

(ii) Categories of the Nyaya Sutras :—

(a) Realism versus Nominalism—Concepts of Samanya, Jati, Upadhi, Akhandopadhi, Avacchedaka—concept of Anugama—Anyataratva—List of Jati-badhakas—Controversies regarding Jati and Vyakti—regarding Samanya and Vishesha—typical views of the Nyaya, the Vaisheshika, the Purva Mimamsa, the Advaita, the Vishishtadvaita and the Dvaita Vedanta, the Buddhist and the Jaina Schools—Whether the Existent (Sat) and the Experienceable (Anubhavya) are co-extensive.

## C.—Classification of Relations :—

Relations, external and internal—Yuta-Sambandha—instances  
—Question of Vishaya-vishayi-sambandha—Vishayata—various views  
—Ayuta-Sambandha—Samavaya as synthetic relation—kinds of  
Samavaya—analytical relations—Question of Paryyaya, Ekarthata,  
Svarupa-sambandha—Visheshanta—Relations of Time and Space  
—Number—Vyasaajya-Vritti—Paryyapti—Avyapya-vritti—Ayavad-  
dravyabhavita—Vaishishtya—Vyadhikarana-Dharma—Pratiyogita  
—Quantification of Propositions, on a connotative basis, how  
dealt with through the concepts of Avachchhinna and Abhavaprati-  
yogi—Categories of Thought as related to Categories of Grammar  
(Katyayana, Patanjali, etc.)

## D.—Theory of Causation :—

(a) Ontological aspect :—Asatkaryā-vada versus Satkaryā-  
vada.

(b) Logical aspect :—Relation of Cause and Effect—Cause,  
the invariable and unconditional antecedent—Ananyathasiddha—  
Classes of Anyathasiddha—Relation of Kadachitkatva to Karyya-  
karanabhava—the question of synchronous causes and effects.

(c) Kinetic aspect :—Parispanda—Karakachakra—Time scheme  
in a chain of causes and effects—ultimate unit of Time and Motion.

(d) Factors in Causation :—Samavayi, Asamavayi, Nimitta  
Kāraṇa—Vyapara—Kāraṇa—Kārakachakra—Collocation (Samagri-  
samsthana)—Immediate Antecedent—Pratibandhaka—Question of  
Shakti—of Atishaya—of Necessity.

## E.—Cosmology :—

(a) Physical and Chemical Theories :—The Atomic theory  
—Arambhavada—Classes of Compounds—Pakajotpatti—Upash-  
tamba—Avashtamba—Vishtamba—Pilupaka and Pitharapaka—  
Theories of Light and Heat—Theory of Reflection—Real and virtual  
images—Laws of Reflection (as implied in some of Bhaskaracharya's  
Vijaganita problems)—Theories of Sound—the Echo—Musical Sounds  
—Concept of current motion—of waves—Ideas of Matter and Motion—  
Kinetics.

(b) Biological Theories—a brief view.

## F.—Psychology :—

Body and mind—Psychological Analysis—Question of In-  
trospection—Limits of certitude—Objective Methods—References to  
the Psychology of Defectives, and to Primitive Psychology, e.g., to  
that of Narikeladvipa-dwellers (without fire and without domesticated  
quadrupeds), for instances of Anadhyavasaya (Indeterminateness) in  
Perception (Jati-kalpana) and Inference (Linga-paramarsha)—Child  
Psychology—the Psychology of Language—Animal Mind—Sub-conscious  
mental processes—Atindriya Jnana—Prana, Manas and Atman—Jnana  
as Spanda-vilakshana—Cognition, Feeling, Desire, Volition—Classifica-  
tion and analysis of mental processes—Attention—Sensation—Sense of  
Bodily Posture—of Innervation—Organic sensations and Pranavik-  
shobha—Touch as the original sense—Special senses—Perception—

Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa—Manasa Pratyaksha—the question of Prapyakarita—Theory of Vision—Perception of Distance—Perception of Motion—of Tamas (Darkness)—of visual images with eyes shut—of Dvichandra and Keshondraka—question of Presentative-representative cognition—of 'tied percepts'—Nyaya treatment—Perception of Alata-chakra—Space and Time relations in Perception—the Sannikarshas—different views—Pratyasattis—Jnana-lakshana Pratyasutti—Yogi-Pratyaksha—Recognition—Memory—Samskara—Bhavana—Association of Ideas—Nyaya and Vedanta views contrasted—Vimarsha—Paramarsha—Time relations of mental phenomena—Apekshabuddhi—Pleasure, Pain and Indifference—Analysis and classification of Emotions and Springs of Action—Compound feelings—Bodily expression of Emotions—the æsthetic sentiments, their classification and analysis—Automatic, Instinctive and Volitional effort—Jivanayoni-prayatna—automatic movements—Sensori-motor reflexes through Tvagindriya or Chakshurindriya and Manovaha Nadi, as in avoiding a tree on the way, a snake on the grass, etc.—Anadya-bhyasavasana—Bhranti (Hallucination), either Indriyaja or Manasi—Mada, moha, murchchha, svapa—Svapna, of six classes according to origin—Sushupti—Unmada and its classification (after Ayurveda). | —Psychology of Doubt—Controversies

F'.—The Aesthetic Sentiment (as elaborated in Alankarashastra) :—

(a) (1) The Aesthetic Sense (Sensibility versus Judgment) :—

Rasabodha—the question of a separate and independent Vritti—why not Anumana or Smriti—Vyanjana Vritti.

(2) Analysis of Chamatkriti—Chamatkarajanakabhavana—train of associations as a constituent element.

(3) The Beautiful—character or mark—Ramaniyata—Lavanya—Saundarya—Alaukikatva—whether subjective or objective, ideal or real.

(4) The æsthetic standard—Pramana and Pramata—the Sahridaya or the Vidagdha as the Pramata—the Rasika—the Samajika or Sabhya—the Margita and the Deshi in Art.

(5) Creative Genius (Pratibha)—Lakshana.

(6) Ritis, conventions, and symbols in Art.

(b) (i) Rasa—relation of Rasa to Ananda—Rasa-svarupa—different views—their philosophical import—realism versus idealism—transcendentalism—the question of mimesis—nature of the histrionic art—the question of suggestion—Vyangya and Vyanjana—Dhvani—Vakrokti—Alankara.

Application to Chitra (and Chitrabhasa)—Realism versus transcendentalism—Sadrishya as an Anga of Chitra—Sadrishyakarana—lokadrishti—Drishta and Adrishta—Shadanga—Bhava in Chitra.

Application to Nritya—Trailokyanukriti—Yatha nritye tatha hitre trailokyanukritih smrita (Vishnu-Dharmottara)—the rhythm of motion as a symbol—Atma as Nartaka behind the screen, and the

Indriyas as Prekshakas (Shiva-sutra-vimarshini)—Shiva as Nataraja—Prakriti as Nati (Sāṃkhya)—Maya-nataka—Buddha-nataka.

Application to Sangita—emotional values of Svaras—connection between Ragas and Rasas—Murtis of Ragas and Raginis—compare with Rasa-chitras—colour-symbolism.

The Fine Arts as disciplines for Moksha.

Rasa-bheda—Uddesha and Lakshana—how far bodily expressions are essential in these characterizations—different enumerations—the question of Bhakti and its inclusion in Rati—the question of Vatsalya—the question of Shantarasa in Natya.

Analysis of Adirasa :—

SHRINGARA—analysis—related factors of cruelty, contempt and suspicion—Sadistic elements—their co-presence explained by location in neighbouring Chakras or Dalas—how jealousy, anger, pride, arrogance (darpa, mana), and other contrary (vipaksha) elements become feeders (poshaka)—age-cycle, e.g., adolescence, youth, maturity, etc., in relation to the evolution of Shringara.

Prema or Raga—Romantic love and its stages (Dasha, Avastha)—analysis of Prema—the two opposed elements of Vinaya (Aham tadya) and Priti (Mama ayam) in Prema—either of the two dominant (prakata), and the other repressed (nigirna)—the two fundamental types, Ghrita-sneha and Madhu-sneha (Masochism and its opposite)—pure (shuddha) and mixed (ashuddha) varieties—Sajatya and Vai-jatya.

Bhavotkarsha—Madhuryya—Atmanivedanasakti—Parama-vira-hasakti—Vivarta-vilasa—Mahabhava—Hladini-shakti.

Jugupsita varieties of Shringara—question of their æsthetic character—whether they have a place in Art—the Vaishnava view of the Anarya (and of Duhkha) as contributing to Bhavotkarsha—the question of Representations of the Nude in Chitra—Æsthetic or Ethical Restrictions on Stage Representations—Art in relation to Morality.

Analysis of Hasyarasa (the Ludicrous)—the place of the Ludicrous in Art—Illustration from the Vidushaka.

Bhava—Sthayibhava—how distinguished from Rasa—Vibhava—Anubhava—[Samchhari-bhava]—Vyabhicharibhava—Alambana—Uddipana—Sahakari—Vyapara—Bhavotkarsha—Bhavashanti—Rise, culmination and subsidence of an Emotion—Drutatva (of Chitta).

(ii) Rasa-virodha—Sthiti-virodha—Jnana-virodha—Conflict of emotions—how resolved—the relation of Karuna and Bibhatsa to Ananda—the place of the Pathetic and the Horrible in Art—the question of a Viyoganta Nataka—the Principle of contrast, simultaneous or successive, as applied to Rasa.

(iii) Rasabhavabhasa—the true and the false in Art.

(c) Asundara—how characterized—doctrine of Dosha.

G.—(a) Ethics :—The psychological basis—the analysis of Motives—Purusha-visheshanatva—Ishtasadhanata, Kriti-sadhyata and other factors—whether Karyyatajnana is sufficient—Pravritti, Jnana-hetu



and Kriya-hetu--Nivritti-yatna—the question of Hedonism—the Moral Standard—whether the agent's own Happiness or Unhappiness is the moral *standard*—or Lokasiddhi (including Paropakara for Punya and Parapakara for Papa—Mahabharata)—or authority (Vidhi-nishedha, either of Ishvara or of the King)—or Loka-prasiddhi (consensus or tradition)—or Atma-santosa (Manu), or a Pierana or Atmakuta in connection with Niyoga—or the Purusha, Atma, the Self, as the ultimate and universal standard—the ethical calculus—Balavattva how determined—Vidhi and Nishedha—the question of Sanction—Classification of Virtues and Vices—the Springs of Action (Doshas) classified—Ethical disciplines—Pratipaksha-bhavana.

(b) The question of Pravritti, Nivritti and Nivritta-Karma, the three ethical attitudes towards life—the Nyaya view.

H.—Social Philosophy : (a) The Padas—Vyavahara—Shishtachara—Mahajana-Prasiddhi—Pratyaya—the Principle of Authority as transcending induction and individual experience—Social consensus—Tradition and Codes—Sadharana Dharma—Duties of Station in life (Varnashrama-dharma)—Concept of Sanatana Dharma compared with Sarvadharmas and Saddharma, and with Vishvadharmas in the Mahabharata—also with Lokasthiti, and Loka-samgraha—the principle of Lokashreyas in the Tantras.

(b) Chaturvarga—Definitions of Kama, Artha and Dharma—Mutual relations of Kamashastra, Arthashastra and Dharmashastra—Trivargapratipatti—Nyaya view—Various concepts of Svarga or Abhyudaya.

(c) The four Ashramas—Mukti open to the Grihastha with or without Karma—the three classes of Veda-sannyasi Brahma-nistha Grihastha (Manu—Kulluka Bhatta)—the latter-day depreciation of Grihasthashrama in various Hindu Sampradayas under the influence of Buddhist monachism—the Nyaya view.

(d) The four Yugas—the theory of advancing moral and social degeneration—*codes* of social purity (in diet, marriage, etc.) accordingly made more and more rigorous in latter-day Smriti—but religion simplified in the interests of women and the masses (Stri-shudradi)—the Sectarian cults also relaxed the rules of the social code—this kind of Progress in Dharma recognized as the result of new dispensations of Providence (Bhagavat-karuna)—the Nyaya view—Mahesvara worshipped by the Naiyayikas.

I.—Theology—the Concept of God—the Divine Attributes—the Theistic proofs in the Nyaya and other systems :—

A.—Concept of God in Nyaya and in other systems—various Concepts—God as personal—as impersonal—as supra-personal—as omni-personal—Relation of Finite Personality to Infinite Personality—different views—God as Svabhava—as Kala—as Niyoga—as **Gudha-manusha**

B.—The Divine Attributes—Svarupa-lakshana and Tatastha-lakshana—the fundamental attributes under each head—different

views—the avoidance of anthropomorphism how secured— ascription only of Nityagunas—smṛiti, bhavana, dūṣka, dvesha rejected (Nyaya-manjari)—Dharma retained as Svabhavika-paramārtha-nishpatti for Bhutanugraha—Jnana only Pratyaksha or Aparoksha (immediate, intuitive) as opposed to Anumana—Ishvara-jnana determines its object as *prius* instead of being determined by the object—the question of the reality of attributes:—

(1) Svarupa real and Tatastha unreal, (2) both independently real, (3) both real in their relation and interdependence, (4) Tatastha real, no separate Svarupa, (5) all attributes unreal or indeterminate.

C.—Theistic Proofs:—

1. Proofs as regards Tatasthalakshanas—God as related to the World and Jivas:—

(i) Pramana-Samuchchaya—Proof by Pratyaksha (Aparoksha-nubhuti)—by Smṛiti (Dhyana)—by Anumana—by Shabda or Agama—by Arthapatti—by Lokprasiddhi—by Aitihiya.

(ii) Special Study of Ishvaranumana:—

(a) Cosmological argument—the argument from Causality, Will-Causality, Agency, Karyyatva, Junyatva, Kriti-janyatva—various meanings of the Hetu (Karyyatva)—various forms of the Paksha—various forms of Sadhya—the question of Sarvashaktimattva—a First Cause—Prayojaka-Karta and Prayojya-Karta—Sarva-Karana-Karana—five different moments in Absolute Causality—Material Cause and Efficient Cause of the world—different views.

(b) Cosmo-teleological argument—

(i) The argument from Sannivesha, Karyyayojana, Arthakriya, Chetanopakara—Various forms of Paksha—various forms of Sadhya—the question of Sarvavit-Kartritva—the question of motive, of material and of effort in relation to the Design Argument.

(ii) Motive of Creation and the Problem of Evil:—Bhutanugraha or Anukampa (Compassion) as the motive to Creation—how the existence of imperfection and suffering is to be explained—Dvesha rejected (Gangesha)—the absence of Knowledge or Power to create a perfect world or to maintain a pristine perfection, also rejected—Evil, the consequence of free acts of Jivas in accordance with the law of Karma (moral causation)—the charge of Vaishamya and Nairghrinya against Providence refuted—Destruction (Pralaya or Samvara), and the creation of Naraka (Hell), ascribed to Daya (Compassion) for the purpose of releasing Jivas from bondage to their own Karma by providing means of Karma-kshaya.

(iii) God as Samyagdarshi—as Adarsha—as author of all Arts, Padas and Vyavaharas.

(iv) Question of one or many Designers—Evidence in favour of Monism—Monism *versus* Pluralism.

(v) The question of Mechanism *versus* Teleologism—Plant-life—the question of a blind unconscious teleology—the question of Instinct—Pratibha *versus* Upaya-jnana—various explanations.

(c) Argument from the World viewed as an Organism to a World-Soul :—

- (i) as in normal consciousness ruling an animated body.
- (ii) as in the case of "possession" of a body by a spirit or spirits.
- (d) Social Foundations of Theistic Belief—Argument from

Padas—from Vyavchhara—from Consensus—from the implications of the principle of authority from Mahajana-Pratyaya—from the very existence of accepted Scriptures and Codes.

(e) The Moral Argument :

(i) Argument from Vidhi-Nishedha or Niyoga to a Personal Authority.

(ii) Argument from Vaishamya to Karmaphala, and from Karmaphala or moral government of the World,

(a) to Ishvara as Phaladata, as Creator placing Jivas in their proper environments according to the Law of Karma, and as Instigator or Promulgator (Vakta) of Codes of Dharma,

or (b) to a Corporation of Souls, e.g., an infinite number of Jivas working in co-operation, or impelled by their Adrishtas or Karmas—Pluralism—God as Anekatmanaya Chinmandala—God as Omnipersonal Bhagavan—as Ananta-vyuha.

(f) The Pragmatic Argument :—

- (i) the advantages of conformity to popular beliefs,
- (ii) the preferability of belief to unbelief in the prevailing uncertainty of existence after death,
- (iii) the need of a conceptual construct of Brahma for the discipline of life or of Mukti.

2. Proofs in relation to Svarupa-lakshana (of God-in-Himself)—from the Philosophy of Experience.

(a) Ultimate Types of Experience :—

(i) Analysis of Sat (Reality) and its Upadhis—of Avasthatraya and Turiya.

(ii) Analysis of Chit and Avidya.

(iii) Analysis of Ananda—of Vishayanandas as Leshas of Akhandananda—of Rasas as modes of Akhandaikarasa.

(b) Ultimate Categories of Experience :—

(i) Analysis of Nityatva and Vibhutva—Infinite Time and Space—the Timeless and the Spaceless—Deshakalanavachchheda,

(ii) Analysis of Prakari and Karta—of Substance and Cause,

(iii) Analysis of Kalyana (the Good)—Kalyana as Absolute, or Kalyana as Akhila-Heyapratyanika—Concept of the Perfect—Argument from Parakashtha.

(c) The ideal of Consummate Experience :—

(i) Jaina Proof of Sarvajna,

(ii) Buddhist concept of a Sarvajna-Santana,

(iii) Patanjala concept of an absolute Purusha.

(iv) Vedantic concept of Jivanmukta and Videha-mukta,

(v) The Bhagavata concept of Bhagavan vs Purushottama

comprehending Brahman and Paramatman—the Vaishnava Trinity,  
 (b) the Perfect Man (Rama) the Consummate Lover (Vidagdha Madhava)

(vi) The Shaiva concept of Paramashiva.

(d) Ultimate Validity of Experience—Proof from Epistemology :---

(i) from Analysis of Prama and Pramanya.

(ii) from Analysis of Samkhya-vishesha (Number)—Analogy of an infinite Number.

(iii) Proof from the Existential Import of propositions,

(iv) Proof from the Analysis of Relations.

J.—The law of Karma :—Akritabhyagama and Kritapranasha rejected—Origin of Evil—the question of Anadiparampara in relation to Karma and Sukha-duhkha-vyavastha.

The question of pessimism—Relation of Sukha to Duhkha—Various views.

Classification of Karma—Samsara.

K.—Apavarga and its means, Tattvajnana—[the question of Chaitanya and of Ananda in Apavarga—the question of the Prapancha—whether a merely negative Apavarga can be a Purushartha].

### SAMKHYA

#### General Survey.

1. Epistemology and Logic :—

(a) Doctrine of Prama—Buddhi and Adhyavasaya—two-fold function of Buddhi, theoretical and practical— Doctrine of Aprama—Doctrine of Pramanyagraha.

(b) Classification and analysis of the Pramanas—Analysis of Pratyaksha—Analysis of Inference—classes of Inference— Purvavat, Sheshavat, Samanyatodrishta—Different interpretations—Vita and Avita—Analysis of Testimony or Shabda—Question whether Shabda (Testimony), *laukika* or otherwise, can be reduced to Inference.

2. (a) The Categories and Theory of Reality—the Tattvas—Purusha—Prakriti—the Gunas—Evolution—Samsrishta-viveka—Alinga, linga, avishesha, vishesha, ayuta-siddha samuha (after Vyasa-bhashya)—Sarga—Pratisarga—Anuloma and Pratiloma (the upward and the downward way)—Special topics :—Pratyaya-sarga—Tanmatra-sarga—Bhuta-sarga—the eight Bhavas—Bhavadhivasa and the Buddhist Vasana—Dharma and Adharma in Samkhya and Jaina doctrines.

(b) Deduction of the Categories.

(c) Theory of Causation—Satkaryavada—Abhivyakti—Upadanakarana—Nimittakarana and Varana-Bheda—Moral Causation and Order superimposed on Natural Causes.

3. Cosmology—Tanmantra-Srishti and Bhutasrishti—Bhutadi—Tanmantras—Bhutas—Parinamavada—Parinamakrama.

4. Psychology :—

(a) The unity of the Empirical Self—No complex of conscious

units or cells—Prana—Samkhya view contrasted with Vedanta, Nyaya and Charvaka views.

(b) The three Gunas and their psychic modes—Psychic Evolution—Sukha, Duhkha, and Moha—their objectivity.

(c) Antahkarana-Traya—Buddhi, Ahankara and Manas, with their Vrittis—Indriyas—their classification with functions—Special topic:—the five sensibles as specific qualities of the different Bhutas—other qualities of matter, mechanical or spatial (Primary)—these apprehended by touch (Charaka), or by touch and sight—different lists of such qualities in the different schools—Resistance or impenetrability, motion, impelling force, extensity, definite shape or outline (murtatva) regarded as marks of Vahir-vishaya (external object) in the different schools—Process of Perception—Relation of Perception to Buddhi—Two-fold Adhyavasaya, theoretical and practical—Buddhi and the three relations of Space, Time and Nimitta (Cause)—Buddhi-nirmana—Prajna—Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa—Savichara and Nirvichara—Buddhi-Sarga—Viparyaya, classification and analysis—Ashakti—Classification of Mental Deficiency—Tushti—Classification of the Sentiments—Siddhi—Samadhi and its Kinds.

(d) Pramatriva and Bhoktriva, how explained—different views—Akartriva of Purusha—Free Will and Necessity.

5. Ethics—Classification of Springs of Action, of Virtues and Vices, and of Temperaments and Character, on the basis of the Three Gunas and their combinations—Ethical disciplines—Sadhanas—the Sthita-prajna—the Trigunatita.

6. Practical Philosophy:—The Doctrine of Laya—Yoga and Samadhi—Prakritipurusha-viveka—Kaivalya.

7. The doctrine of Avidya, Vasana, Aviveka—Relation of Avidya to Prakriti—to Vedantic Avidya and Maya—Bandha and Moksha—whether Bandha is svabhavika, naimittika, or aupadhika—the *Summum Bonum*. (ii) Bhoga-vyavastha discussed

8. The Individual and the World—one or many Purushas—one or many Worlds—the question of Ishvara.

9. The question of Idealism and Realism:—

(a) as regards cosmic evolution and its order,

(b) as regards the relations of Time, Space and Cause, and their origin in Buddhyaropa and Buddhi-nirmana,

(c) as regards the objectivity of Sukha and Duhkha,

(d) as interpreted in the light of the Samkhya refutation of Buddhist Vijnana-vada and Shunya-vada,

(e) as regards the relation between Artha and Arthi.

10. The question of Mechanism and Teleologism—concept of Samhata-Pararthatva—relation between Drik and Ichchha—blind Will.

11. Vijnana-bhikshu's attempted Synthesis of Samkhya and Vedanta.

## PATANJALA YOGA.

*Special Topics.*

1. Cosmology—Concept of Parinama:—Dharma, Lakshana, Avastha—temporal signs—Kshanas—Patanjali's views of Parinama or Flux contrasted with the Buddhist and Jaina views—Actualism—Kala as Buddhi-nirmana.

2. Psychology—Concept of Vrittis—Pramana, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidra and Smriti—the five Kleshas—the Tapa-traya as subtler than the conventional Duhkha-traya—the Chitta-bhumis.

3. Ethical disciplines—Maitri, Karuna, Mudita, Upeksha—Upeksha compared with Buddhist Tatramadhyasthata—the three Bhavanas—Sarvabhauma Mahavratas—Vitarkas and Prati-pakehabhavana—Prati-prasava—Viveka-Khyati—comparison of Patanjala, Jaina, Buddhist, Advaita-Vedanta and Nyaya-Vaisheshika ethical disciplines—Basic principle and characteristic method and procedure of each of these forms.

4. (a) Yoga as Chittavritti-nirodha—the eight Angas—Yama—Niyama—Pranayama—Dharma, Dhyana, Samadhi—the various kinds of Samadhi—Kaivalya.

(b) Samyama and Vibhutis—Relation of Rajayoga to Hathayoga. (c) Seven Yoga-bhumis (Yoga-vashishta)

5. The concept of Ishvara—Ishvara for varanaveda at Creation—Ishvara as Guru and Anugrahaka—as Sampradayapradyotaka—Ishvara-pranidhana.

6. (i) Later Developments of Yoga—Hatha Yoga—Asanas and Mudras—the Shatchakra—auto-hypnotism—other Phenomena of Hypnotism—Gocharas as hypnotic symbols in Buddhist Dhyanas—the Utsavapayita—Aumukhya—the Supta-Prabuddha—Krathana—Jyotih-prasara. (ii) Mystical phenomena—visual and aural types.

7. (i) Siddhis—clairvoyance, clair-audience, thought-reading, interpretation of veridical dreams, understanding the language of animals, jati-smara-siddhi (knowledge of past lives)—the Aishvaryas, anima, laghima (levitation), transportation, Prakamyas, Vashitva, Ishitva, animating other bodies, materialisation but without Jagadvyapara—Samapattis—Dvindriya-samapatti. (ii) Siddha-jnana (clairvoyance, etc.) contrasted with Arsha-jnana.

**Purva Mimamsa.**

PURVA MIMAMSA:—Views of the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras (also other typical views) on the following topics:—

1. (a) Epistemology:—Prama and Pramanyagraha—Consciousness valid in itself—the problem of Error and of Contradiction—the meaning of Nedam rajatan—the question of Traikalika-nishedha—the question of Smriti-pramosha—Akhyativada.

(b) Logic:—The Pramanas—analysis of Pratyaksha—Satsamprayoga—Anumana, whether Samanya-Vishaya or Vishesha-Vishaya or both—The question of Grihitagrahitva (*petitio principii*)—whether the Vyapti itself is an Anumana—the definition of a cause—whether

Niyatatva is necessary in addition to Anyatha-siddhi-ahunyata--  
 Apaurusheyatva--Shabdanityatva-- Shabdartha-sambandha-nityatva  
 —Upamans—Arthapatti—Kinds of Arthapatti—Arthapatti, how  
 related to Kalpana (Hypothesis)—and to Hypothetical-Disjunctive  
 syllogisms—whether Arthapatti reducible to inference—whether in-  
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 Pramans—Yogyanupalabdhi—the question of Yogyata in relation  
 to Sasha-shringa—in relation to Paramanu—in relation to Dharma  
 and Adharma in one's own self—in relation to Santanantara—in  
 relation to Ishvara—Discussion.

(c) Dialectic—(i) The Doctrine of Abhava as a Padartha—  
 the nature of Tamas—Abhavagraha—dialectic of Negation— various  
 theories,

(ii) the import of Propositions— various theories.

(iii) Nominalism, Realism and Conceptualism— Jati, Samayaya,  
 Avayavi, examined. —Padashakti (Jati, Vyakti, Vishishta, etc.)

2. Psychology— the problem of Self-consciousness—of Jnana  
 knowing itself—the question of successive steps—whether the know-  
 ing self is intuited or inferred—the question of Triputi-Samvit—  
 Anubhuti—Presentation—Representation—question of mixed modes  
 —Pratyaksha—the question of Prapyakarita versus Aprapyakarita  
 —Theories of Vision—the Inverted Image—crooked line of vision  
 in cases of Reflection (Iambamana-ahivat)—ideas of space, how  
 acquired—whether all Sense perceptions involve space—Motion  
 whether perceived or inferred—Pratyabhijnana—Smriti—Feelings—  
 Mixed modes—Desire—Volition.

3. Ethics :—The Ethical Standard—Rejection of Happiness  
 or Utility as standard—Dharma as Eternal Order and Natural Law  
 —Vidhinidhedha—Freedom of the will implied in Vidhi or Chodana  
 —the Sanction according to the Bhattas—the view of the Prabhakaras  
 —various kinds of Bhavana—Prerana—difference between Prerana  
 (moral imperative) and Pravartana (motive power or actuation)—  
 difference between Kartri-Karya and Praishya-Praishi Sambandha  
 —Niyoga—distinction between Jnapaka and Karaka—the factors  
 in a Niyoga—the Niyoga, its own sanction—and its own end—the  
 Niyoga as Categorical Imperative contrasted with Hypothetical  
 Imperatives—the question of Kamana in relation to Niyoga—the  
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 in relation to Karma—Pragmatic explanation of Brahman as auxi-  
 liary to Pratipatti-vidhi, or to Upasana for Prapanchavilaya.

[Special Problems in Ethics (in the Mimamsa and other schools) :—

(i) The Problem of Ahimsa :—

(a) The ethics of Vaidha-himsa—distinction between Abhi-  
 chara (e.g., shyona) and Yaga for Svarga (e.g., Jyotishtoma)—the case  
 of Agnisomiyahimsa—Black magic and white magic—Controversy  
 between the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras—Discussion of Dharma,  
 Adharma, Artha, Anartha, Vidhichodana and Nishedhachodana, in  
 this connection—the views of the older Naiyayikas—the Navyas—

the Samkhya view—the Patanjala view—Patanjali on Sarvabhauma Mahavratas.

(b) (i) The ethics of self-defence against the Atatayi—the six cases in which Himsa is allowed or is even obligatory—Venkatesha in support of Vaidha-himsa (including possible Abhichara) (Nyaya-Parishuddhi); (ii) the ethics of Dharma-yuddha (War of Righteousness) and of Svadharmā in relation to War—the Buddhist view of War and of Kshatra-dharma in relation to War (Aryyadeva); (iii) the ethics of Hunting (Mrigaya); (iv) the ethics of killing animals for food—Manu on Pravritti and Nivritti—the Buddhist Vagbhata on the use of forbidden food and drink (or aphrodisiacs) for medical purposes.

(c) The Jaina and Buddhist doctrines of Ahimsa—ethical grounds—Hemachandra and Mallishena against Pashu-ghata (Syadvada-manjari)—whether animals are automata, or hypnotised into insensibility by the mantras at Yajnas—limitations to Ahimsa recognized in Buddhism and in Jinism—Ahimsa and 'Jive daya' in the Vaishnava doctrines—the doctrine that all Nature breathes goodwill and non-injury to those who never injure (Prahlada in the Vishnupurana)—the teaching of Rishabha (Adinatha) in the Bhagavata Purana—Shaivism and Ahimsa.

(d) The ethics of Suicide—Prayopaveshana and other Vratas—Kashi-marana—Samadhi-marana—Jaina Sallekhana.

(ii) The duties of Satya, Asteya, and Brahma-charyya (or Chastity), whether absolutely and universally binding, or admitting of exceptions and qualifications—different standpoints—Panchanritani—causuistical problems—conflict of duties—Illustrations from the Itihasas and the Puranas—from the Jatakas and Avadanas—the Akhyana of Ani Mandavya.

(iii) Whether the Chodana or Niyoga on which the moral code is based has absolute validity, or whether moral precepts are only relative and provisional for Loka-yatra-nirvaha (like rules of the road)—the question of the relativity of moral obligations and of their origin in custom (Achura, Shishhta-parigraha, Deshadi-dharma, Deshaka-labheda, Yuga-bheda), or in Temperament (Ashayabheda, Karma-vipaka).]

4. (a) Social Philosophy—Mahajana—Lokasthiti—the Principle of Social authority—the Origin of Codes and Institutions—Dharma, and the State as Upholder of Dharma—Reply to Charvaka.

(b) Political and Juristic Philosophy:—

Fundamental concepts in Smriti and Arthashastra as interpreted by Mimamsa Nyaya — **Postulates, Concepts and Institutions:—**

(i) Element of Pluralism in Polity:—Structural Compositeness of Hindu Polity—the Primacy of the Community or group as against the State or the individual—Various organized groups—Relation of Village Communities, Pancha-mandalis, Shrenis, Pugas, Monastic Orders, to the State—Question of their independent, parallel or co-ordinate jurisdiction—Nature of Charters granted by the State—the



Sanction of the State—relations between State Courts and the jurisdictions of the local bodies—between State Officers and local authorities—Responsibility of the State Officers and of the State.

(ii) Element of Pluralism in theories regarding the origin of the State—Buddhist theories—theories in Arthashastra—the Mahabharata theories—Original agrarian Strife or original Matsya-Nyaya how terminated by social contract, or by divine ordination, or by one ratifying the other—no militaristic origin as in 'Monistic' States—the King, no priest or magician as in primitive tribal organizations—Theory of the origin of the Hindu Polity out of tribal assemblies—Coronation ceremonies and oaths as bearing witness to tribal origin—tribal Aristocracies and Republics in Ancient India as other developments of tribal assemblies—the Mahabharata on the Constitution of Ganas (military or other republics).

(iii) Element of Pluralism in the Theory of the Functions of the State—Differentiation between the Legislative and the Executive Functions—the Executive Function—the Danda—the King as organ—Councils and Cabinet—the Legislative Function differentiated in theory—Organs of Legislation—the Judicial Function—Organs—Relations of these organs and functions to one another through the King as Head—the Military Function—the seven elements of the State—Place of Dharma, or Morality, in Arthashastra and Dandaniti—different views—(1) Brihaspati, Ushanas, Bharadvaja, and Kautilya, (2) Utathya, Bhishma, Shri Krishna, (3) Aryyadeva—the Buddhist and the Jaina views, (4) the orthodox Brahminical school in the Dharmasutras and the Dharmashastras.

(iv) Element of Pluralism in Inter-State relations :—Mandalas of States—the three-State or four-State Mandala—Other composite Mandalas—Balance of States—Concepts of Aikarajya, Samrajya, Vairajya—the Concept of Raja-chakravarti—Autonomy of Subordinate States within defined limits—Inter-State relations in War and Peace—War humanized—Mahabharata, Dharmashastra, and Arthashastra regulations under this head, separately considered—how far the humano regulations were actually observed—the Buddhist Concept of Dharma as the Law of Nations—Territorial Nationality—Extra-territorial Nationality—Nationality based on Dharma.

(v) Element of Pluralism in the Spheres of Jurisprudence and Law :—Concept of Positive Law—the four independent sources of Law—Relative Priority of Shastra and Rajajna—different Schools—Achara—Samaya or Conventions as Source of Law—Law by Interpretation—Canons of Interpretation in Mimamsa Nyaya—Codification—Sanctions—the theory of offences as being against Dharma, or against the State—the theory of Punishment.

(vi) Element of Pluralism in the Hindu Family as an Institution :—The patriarchal basis of the family—the wife's adoption into the husband's gotra and kula—the standards of individualistic marriage, in what measure applicable—the end of marriage—the Grihya Samskaras—the Pancha Maha-yajnas—Organization of the family life

for social ends—the need of the Aryas in the early Smṛiti period for multiplication and expansion—marriage, adoption, Shrāddha, and inheritance customs regulated by this sovereign need—the Ideal of Marriage—Sacramental *versus* Contractual marriage—the four forms of Dharmya marriage (Kautilya's Arthashastra)—a second wife permitted in these cases for the sake of male offspring, only under defined conditions—penalties for breach—no divorce (moksha) for Dharmya marriages—in the other four forms of marriage (by consensual union, purchase, capture, etc.) there was moksha (divorce) but only by mutual consent—wife's stridhan safe-guarded by legal provisions and penalties against husband's appropriation in the case of non-sacramental marriages (Kautilya)—Asavarna marriage—Children of mixed marriages—their socio-legal status—Buddhist marriage a contract—Society *versus* the Individual in the Hindu Institution of Marriage—the concept of Society-in-the-Individual.

(vii) Element of Pluralism in property as an Institution :—  
 (a) Family Property :—Property and Inheritance—*Stirps* or family *versus* individual—*Samashti versus Vyashti* in the concept of Property—Philosophical concept of Corporate Personality (Shri-Krishna Tarkalankara)—gradual development of individualistic ideas of property—Concept of the *Stirps-in-the-Individual*. (b) Extent of Communal property in land—Common village land—Common village pasture—Original communal right to redistribution of holdings—Original communal right to pre-emption—Original share of the village community in the produce of the individual tiller—Co-operative labour for common village ends—Common village funds—Original right to the soil, of the community of tillers as against land-lord or State—Concept of the Community-in-the-Individual.

(viii) The Elements of Monism in the Hindu Polity—the divinity of the ruler as maintainer of Dharma and wielder of Danda—the Hindu Polity, neither monistic nor pluralistic, but a pluralistically determined Monism—Contrast with the Monistic State of Roman type—The Buddhist State of a pluralistic and secular character—the King as Ganadasa—the Buddhist concept of a Universal Code.

5. The doctrine of the Atman—different views in the Purva Mimamsa schools.

6. Karma *versus* Ishvara—

(i) Moral causation—an Impersonal Eternal Order—Dharma and Adharma—Apurva—History of the words Adrishta and Apurva—various theories of Apurva—the question of deferred effects—Reply to Charvaka—the doctrine of Apurva compared with the Jaina and the Buddhist view of deferred effects (Vyavahita Phala)—Karma, Adrishta and Creation—Karma classified—Adrishta and Purusha-kara.

(ii) Later Mimamsa views—(a) the question of Ishvara or Brahma as needed for Upasana—whether these are mere conceptual constructs—question of Jnana-vidhi, (b) question of Ishvara as

Shrashta—acceptance of Ishvara without Srashtriva on the authority of Shabda-pramana (Gaga Bhatta).

(iii) Comparison with Yavanamata (thirty-first vidya)—Ishvara as Creator in Yavanamata—Virtue and Vice (Dharma and Adharma) in Yavanamata, independently of religious codes, Shruti or Smriti—moral rules for the conduct of life, the same in Yavanamata as in the Brahminical codes. (Vyavaharaya ya nimirubhayoravivadini—Shukra-niti.)

7. (i) Magic, ceremonialism, ethicality, in relation to Karma as conceived in the Purva Mimamsa—how far the Karmic code is a code of Morality—the moralization of Karma in the Orthodox systems, how achieved—Kamyā, Nitya, and Naimittika Karma in relation to Injunction (Vidhi or Niyoga) and to Sanction, in the different schools of the Mimamsa, (ii) Internal as opposed to External Morality—Whether Intention (Uddesha) or Consequence (Phala) determines the (ethical) rightness or wrongness of acts—Various views—Various grades or degrees of intention with various shades of moral responsibility—Akamakrita and Ajnanakrita acts—meaning of Prayaschitta (Vachanika) for such acts—Pamktheyatva and Apamktheyatva.

8. Karma-marga—Jnana and Upasana in relation to Karma—different views in the Purva-Mimamsa schools.

9. Concept of Paramapurushartha—different views of the relation of the Individual to the World in Apavarga.

## UTTARA MIMAMSA.

### I. Advaita.

#### A. Theory of Knowledge and Logic: --

(a) Prama and Pramanyagraha—the question of Svatastva or Paratastva of Pramanya (i) as regards Utpatti, (ii) as regards Jnapti—meaning of Svatastva and Paratastva—controversies among the Samkhyas, the Bauddhas, the Advaitins, the Dvaitins, the Naiyayikas, the Bhattas, the Prabhakaras and the Jainas (i) as regards Pramanyagraha, (ii) as regards Prama—Doctrine of Aprama—The Pramanas—Analysis of Pratyaksha as Jneya and as Jnana—Question of Yogyata—Analysis of Pratibhasika Rajata—Analysis of Svapna—Kevala-Sakshivedyatva—Ishvara-Pratyaksha—Anumana—Rejection of Kevalavyatireki—the question of Lingaparamarsha—Shabda—the meaning of Apaurusheya—the question of Shabdajanya Aparoksha—Upamana, whether a case of 'Conversion of a 'Symmetrical' relation—Arthapatti—Anupalabdhi—Relative Priority of Pratyaksha and Shabda—Anumana how applied to establish Prapancha-Mithyatva—Place of Anumana in the Theistic Proof—Ground of the validity of Shruti—Antya Pramana—Aparokshanubhuti versus Pratibha and Chodana.

(b) Doctrine of Adhyasa—Anirvaohaniyakhyati—Contrasted, with Akhyati, Asatkhyati, Anyathakhyati, Viparitakhyati, Atmakhyati, Satkhyati and Alaunikakhyati.

(c) Import of Propositions—Relations between Subject and Predicate—Akhandarthatva—application to Satyam Jnanam Anantam—application to Tattvamasi—different interpretations of Tattvamasi in the Advaita Schools.

B. Dialectic :—

(a) Dialectic of Experience :—(i) Anubhūti as One, Eternal and Svaprakasha—the doctrine of Nirvisheshu-vastu—Chitrajnana discussed.

(ii) Prapanchamithyatva—Jnana-nivartyatva and four other definitions—Mithyatva-mithyatva—Place of Mithya Prapancha, Mithya Guru and Mithya-shravana in a scheme of Absolute Monism.

(b) Dialectic of Relation :—Rejection of Bheda, of Guna-guni-bhava, and of the relation Knower and Known—Rejection of Samavaya and Jati—The concept of Tadatmya-Sambandha—the question of Svarupa-sambandha—of an anitya-Samavaya.

(c) Dialectic of Causation—Karyya-Karana Sambandha—controversies with the Nyaya, the Samkhya and the Madhyamika—Prithagarthakriya.

(d) (i) Dialectic of Nescience—the question of Bhavarupa Ajnana—Concept of Anirvachaniya—Sadasadvilakshana—Sadasdatmika—contrasted with the Alikā and the Viruddha—Place of the Law of Non-contradiction in Advaita Dialectics—Nishedha of Paraspara-viruddha for Vishvama-sattas and for Sama-sattas.

(ii) How Ajnana can be known—various proofs of Avidya.

C. Brahma Maya and Avidya—Compare with Maya of the Paninidarshana and of the Shaiva-siddhanta—Ishvara-Sakshi—Jiva-Sakshi—the Prapancha—whether there is a common Prapancha (trans-subjective world) for separate Jivas (individuals)—Brahma, Ishvara or Jiva as the Upadanakarana and the Adhishtana of Prapancha—Who is the Ashraya of Avidya—different views in different schools of Advaitism—Abhasavada—Pratibimbavada—Avachchhedavada—occasional use of physical symbols, mainly visual (e.g., Pratibimba, abhasa, prakasha, rupa, akara, etc.) to express *metaphysical ideas*, a much-misunderstood trait of Indian Thought—this trait traceable to the Upanishads—Pratibimba, whether real (Satya) or unreal (Mithya)—relation to Bimba—Bheda or Abheda—the doctrine of one or many Jivas, and of Sarva-Mukti with Hiranyagarbha—the question of San-karyya and Vikara in Ishvara-consciousness—Avarana-Shakti and Vikshepa-Shakti of Maya—Mulajnana and Avasthajnana.

D. Cosmology. (i) Theories of Creation—Vivarta and Parinama—Upadana and Nimitta-Karana—the doctrines of Shrishti-drishti and Drishti-srishti—Shabda-Prapancha—Avyakrita—Nama-rupa—[Refutation of Samkhya Parinamavada and of Arambhavade].

(ii) Order of genesis in the Vedanta compared with that in the Samkhya—theories of Pralaya and Cycles.

E. Ontology: Turiya and Avasthutraya—Brahma, Ishvara, Kutastha and Jiva—various theories of Sushupti and of Svapna.

F. Samashti and Vyashti—Ishvara, Hiranyagarbha and Virat—Concept of Abhimani-Devata.

G. Psychology :—(\*) Body and Mind.

(\*) The Heart and the Brain—The cerebral and the spinal nerves—Manovaha and Ajnavaha Nadis (cf. afferent and efferent nerves)—Manaschakra and Ajnachakra (cf. sensory and motor tracts)—the Sympathetic System and its ganglia—their functions—the Pranas and their functions—Antahkarana and its four Vrittis—Nature and Classification of the Indriyas—Perception and its classes—Nirvikalpa—Mahasamanya—Savikalpa—the Sannikarshas—the question of Surabhichandana Pratyaksha—Perception of Valaka in the sky—the question of Dharavahika Jnana—temporal signs—Perception of Change—Persistence and subsidence of presentations—Conflict of Presentations—the question of Audasinya—Samskara—mixed modes, presentative-representative—the question of the time element in Perception, Inference and Shabda—Origin of ideas of Space—whether space is a condition of all sense-perception—Desha, Kala, Nimitta as categories of the Understanding (Dhi)—Association of ideas as Samana-Samvid-Vedyatva—Concept of class—Presence of one or many Images in a class-concept—Pratyablijnana—Smriti—Relation to Samskara—Sankalpa and Vikalpa—Emotions and Passions—Classification—Desire—Springs of action and their classes—Will—Ananda—Akhand-Rasa—Relation to Vishaya-Rasa—to the æsthetic Rasas—Intellectualism versus Voluntarism.

H. Ethics :—

(a) Preya and Shreyas—Sattvavivridhi—Nishkama Karma—the moral standard in the Ethics of self-realization—Classification of Springs of Action—Vasanas classified as Siddha and Malina,—as Shubha and Ashubha—conquest of Vasana by Vasana—the characteristic Bhavanas for Vasana-Kshaya.

(b) The question of Vidhi in relation to Jnana—Nivoga as Chidabhasa. (c) Moral Deliberation (Shankara, Yoga-vashishta)

I. Disciplines for Mukti :—

(a) Jijnasa and its conditions :—Sadhanachatushtaya—Shra-vana, Manana, Nidhidhyasana—Asambhavana and Viparita-bhavana how conquered—the question of Dhyanaja Prama and Sanskrita-Manas—the Vivarana view—Aparokshanubhuti.

(b) Bhavanas—Vasana-kshaya, Manonasha and Tattva-jnana.

J. Mukti—Jivanmukti—the question of a separate Videha-mukti—Nirvana-mukti—Nature of Mukti—Mukti as eternally realized.

K. Place of Karma and Upasana in relation to Jnana—attitude towards Kamyakarma—towards Nitya and Naimittika Karma—Karma-Samnyasa—Vividisha—question of Pravrajya—Naishkarmya—Free Will and Necessity—Spontaneity—Beyond Good and Evil.

L. Question of Vritti in Atmajnana and Avidyanivritti.

M. Immanence and Transcendence—Saguna and Nirguna Brahma.

N. Forms of Nirvishesha Doctrine other than Shankara's—Differences with Shankara.

## II. Vishishtadvaita.

A. Theory of Knowledge, Logic and Dialectic :—

(1) Analysis of Experience—Knowledge of Savishesha-Vastu against Nirvishesha-Vastu—Aprithaksiddhi—Vishesha-Visheshana-Bhava—Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa—Samanya—Vishesha—Akriti.

(2) Nature of Anubhuti—Difference of Anubhuti and Satta—Reality of the Knower and the Known in Anubhuti—Reality of Bheda—of change and succession—Analysis of Ahankara—Nature of Su-shupti.

(3) Avidya—Character of Avidya, Ajnana, Maya—Seven kinds of Anupapatti against Shankara's doctrine of Avidya.

(4) Doctrine of Prama and Pramanyagraha—Doctrine of Viparyyaya—the Pramanas—Pratyaksha—Meaning of Nirvikalpa—Anumana—the number of Avayavas—the question of Sakriddershana or Bhuyodarshana for Vyaptigraha—Smriti—Shabda—Agamapramanya—Nirupadhi—Mahajana-Parigraha—Reply to Svaira-rasikas and Charvakas—Relative Priority of Pratyaksha and Shabda—Conflict of Pramanas how determined—Niravakashatva and Ananyathasiddhatva—Proof of Ishvara, whether Anumana or Shabda—Place of Anumana in the Theistic proof—Refutation of the theory that the Prapancha is a joint product of an infinite number of finite Jivas, or a resultant of their Karmas. (II) Hetvabhassa *cinasti* *ad*.

(5) Shabdashakti—Shakti and Lakshana—Shakti of Pada—Vakyartha—Anvitarthabhidhana and other theories—Analytical and Synthetical Relations expressed in Propositions—Meaning of Satyam Jnanam Anantam—of Tattvamasi—of the proposition, "This is a Cow"—Real meaning of Nirguna.

B. Reality :—The three Tattvas, Chit, Achit, Ishvara—Relation of Ishvara to Chit and Achit—distinctive characters of the three Tattvas. Analysis of Jnana and Shakti into their ultimate moments—Divine Will as First Cause—dialectic movement in Will-causality—the five moments, Shakti, Vala, Aishvarya, Virya, Tejas.

C. Theistic Philosophy—Doctrine of Creation—Free Will and Law—Meaning and Purpose of Shastra—Providence and Divine Government—God as Krita-Kritya through Jiva and as Kritajna—Ishvara as the Perfect Person—Ananta Gunas—Jnana, Shakti, Saundaryya, Kalyana—other attributes—Concept of Lila—Jnana and Shakti of Ishvara—their operation—the Ethical Code of Virtues and Duties deduced from the Divine attributes—Svartha, Sva-parartha and Kevala-parartha acts—the last challenged by the Nyaya, as even the Buddha accomplishes Svaprayojana through Sakala-sattva-hita—Divine Justice and Mercy—Purushakritya and Kshama—Vatealya—Sin and Punishment—Intercession—Grace—Samhara—Universal ultimate redemption.

## D. Disciplines for Mukti :-

(i) Place of Karma--Jnana-virodhi Karma how overcome by Dharma--what Karma is conducive to Jnana--Brahmavidya.

(ii) Bhakti as Dhruvanusmriti--as Darshanarupata--Aids to Bhakti--Viveka, Vimoka, Abhyasa, Kriya, Kalyana, Anavasada and Anuddharsha--Necessity of Bhakti and Grace--different Bhakti schools--Upadhi and Bandha, being real, are not Jnana-nivartya--Discussion.

(iii) Prema--Prapatti--the three marks of absolute Prapatti--Prapatti-marga compared with Raga-marga and Pushti-marga.

E. Mukti--Purushartha--four kinds of good--Parama-purushartha--Various kinds of Mukti--Paramukti.

F. The Godhead--Panchadhavasthiti--Antaryyami--Sukshma--the Chaturvyuha--Vibhava--Archa--Eternal generation in the Vyuhas--Lila, Prakata and Aprakata--Lakshmi as the Mother-in-God--as the *ne plus ultra* of Prapatti.


G. Interpretation of Pauranic History as God's Dispensation to Man. His Forms of Vishishtadvaita other than Ramanuja's

## III. Dvaita.

A. Doctrine of Prama and Pramanyagraha--the Pramanas--Kevalapramana and Anupramana--Pratyaksha--Sannikarsha--the question of Sannikarsha-parampara--the question of Samavaya and of Visheshya-Visheshana-sambandha -- Svarupa-sambandha -- the question of Smriti and of Pratyabhijnana--analysis of Anumana--Lingaparamarsha--Vyapti or Sahacharyya--whether this is Sambandha-matra between Hetu and Sadhya, or a specific relation of Samanadhikaranyaa--Paksha-dharmata--Samuchita-deshadi-vritti is its only legitimate meaning--the case of Vyadhikarananumana presents no difficulty on this view--the question of five Avayavas--Classes of Anumana, Karyya, Karana, and Akaryya-karana--Upadhi--classes of Upadhi--question of Vyatirekavyapti.


Four kinds of correlation between Dharmas (or attributes)--two being relations of uniform co-existence (Vyapti), and two of incompatibility, complete or partial (Parihara):

(i) Sama-vyapti, *e.g.*, wherever there is the dharma A, there is the dharma B, and wherever there is the dharma B, there is the dharma A--Proper diagram



where the line represents a locus.

(ii) Vishama-vyapti, *e.g.*, wherever there is A, there is B, but at least in one case, where B is, A is not.--proper diagram



(iii) Paraspara-pariharaiva vrittih, *e.g.*, A and B never co-exist--proper diagram

